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I. INTRODUCTION
In every developed market economy, the law provides for a set of
standard-form legal entities. In the United States, these entities include,
among others, the business corporation, the cooperative corporation, the
nonprofit corporation, the municipal corporation, the limited liability
company, the general partnership, the limited partnership, the private trust,
the charitable trust, and marriage. To an important degree, these legal
entities are simply standard-form contracts among the parties who
participate in an enterprise-including, in particular, the organization's
owners, managers, and creditors. It is therefore natural to ask what more, if
anything, these entities offer. Do they-as the current literature increasingly
implies-play essentially the same role performed by privately supplied
standard-form contracts, just providing off-the-rack terms that simplify
negotiation and drafting of routine agreements?' Or do the various legal
entities provided by organizational law permit the creation of relationships
that could not practicably be formed by contract alone? In short, what, if
any, essential role does organizational law play in modern society?
We offer an answer to that question here. In essence, we argue that the
essential role of all forms of organizational law is to provide for the
creation of a pattern of creditors' rights-a form of "asset partitioning" -
that could not practicably be established otherwise.' One aspect of this asset
partitioning is the delimitation of the extent to which creditors of an entity
can have recourse against the personal assets of the owners or other
beneficiaries of the entity. But this function of organizational law-which
includes the limited liability that is a familiar characteristic of most
corporate entities-is, we argue, of distinctly secondary importance. The
truly essential aspect of asset partitioning is, in effect, the reverse of limited
liability-namely, the shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of
the creditors of the entity's owners or managers. This means that
organizational law is much more important as property law than as contract
law. Surprisingly, this crucial function of organizational law has rarely been
the explicit focus of commentary or analysis.3
1. E.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 24-25 (1991); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 396 (4th ed.
1992); see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
2. A preliminary version of the economic argument developed here was presented at the
European Economic Association meeting in Santiago, Spain, in September 1999, and published as
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning, 44 EUR.
ECON. REV. 807 (2000).
3. Since we offered our initial paper on this issue, id., Paul Mahoney, building on that
analysis, has written a short but informative essay exploring the historical roots of asset
partitioning in organizational law. Paul Mahoney, Contract of Concession? An Essay on the
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II. FIRMS AND LEGAL ENTITIES
There are a variety of ways to coordinate the economic activity of two
or more persons. One common approach is to have each of those persons
enter into a contract with a third party who undertakes the coordination
through design of the separate contracts and, most importantly, through
exercise of the discretion given the third party by those contracts. A third
party that serves this coordination function is what we commonly call a
"firm." The firm therefore serves-not just metaphorically, but quite
literally-as the requisite "nexus of contracts" for the persons whose
activity is to be coordinated: It is the common party with whom each of
those persons has an individual contract.4
Economic theory does not offer a completely satisfactory explanation
for the fact that productive activity is commonly organized in the form of
large nexuses of contracts, in which a single central actor contracts
simultaneously with employees, suppliers, and customers who may number
in the thousands or even millions. Why, for example, are organizational
employment relationships not constructed in the form of contractual
cascades, in which each employee contracts, not directly with the firm, but
rather with his or her immediate superior, so that the pattern of contracts
corresponds to the authority relationships we see in a standard pyramidal
organization chart? Although this subject is interesting, we will not delve
into it here. Rather, we will simply take it for granted that it is essential, in
modem market economies, that such large nexuses of contracts can be
constructed.5
History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REv. 873 (2000). We say a few more words on these
historical issues in Part IX infra.
4. The now-familiar economic concept of the firm as a "nexus of contracts" derives from
Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,
62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972); and Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
5. The literature that focuses on asset specificity to explain vertical integration is of course
important here, for example, OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM (1985); and Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978), as is the "property rights"
approach to the theory of the firm that has evolved out of that work, most conspicuously in the
work of Hart and Moore, for example, OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL
STRUCTURE (1995); and Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,
98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
A related but somewhat different reason for large centralized nexuses (as opposed, for
example, to more decentralized structures) may be the need to avoid opportunistic threats to
disassemble a set of transactional relationships that has been costly to assemble, or to expropriate
an entrepreneur's or organization's accumulated experience with working procedures and forms
of organization. E.g., RAGHURAM RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, THE FIRM AS A DEDICATED
HIERARCHY: A THEORY OF THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF FIRMS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7546, 1998). All of this literature, however, seems to leave
important things unexplained. E.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 15 n.8
(1996).
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To serve effectively as a nexus of contracts, a firm must generally have
two attributes. The first is well-defined decisionmaking authority. More
particularly, there must be one or more persons who have ultimate authority
to commit the firm to contracts. We term those persons the "managers" of
the firm. In a corporation, the managers (as we use the term here) are the
members of the firm's board of directors; in a partnership, they are the
firm's general partners.6 The firm's managers may or may not be distinct
from the persons for whose benefit the managers are charged to act-
namely, the firm's owners or, in the case of nonproprietary organizations,
the firm's beneficial owners or beneficiaries. (For simplicity, we generally
use the simple term "owners," rather loosely, to refer to all of these
persons: the partners in a general partnership, the shareholders of a business
corporation, and the members of a cooperative, as well as the limited
partners in a limited partnership, the beneficial owners of a private trust, the
beneficiaries of a nonprofit corporation, and the residents of a municipal
corporation.)
The second attribute a firm must have, if it is to serve effectively as a
locus of contracts, is the ability to bond its contracts credibly-that is, to
provide assurance that the firm will perform its contractual obligations.
Bonding generally requires that there exist a pool of assets that the firm's
managers can offer as satisfaction for the firm's obligations.7 We term this
pool of assets the firm's "bonding assets."
A natural person has the two attributes just described, and hence can-
and very frequently does-serve as a firm, in the form of a sole
proprietorship. In this case, the single individual is both manager and
owner, and the bonding assets consist of all of the assets owned by that
individual. Note, however, that individuals have these attributes because the
law provides them. In particular, the law gives an individual the authority to
enter into contracts that will bind him in most future states, and the law also
provides that, if the individual defaults on a contract, the other party will
have (unless waived) the right to levy on all assets owned by that individual
(which is to say that the law provides that all assets owned by an individual
serve as bonding assets).
Legal entities, like individuals, are legal (or "juridical") persons in the
sense that they also have the two attributes described above: (1) a well-
defined ability to contract through designated managers, and (2) a
6. In large partnerships, authority is sometimes delegated to designated managing partners. In
those cases, only the latter partners would constitute managers in our sense of the term.
7. There are alternative means of bonding performance. The most obvious is to expose the
firm's managers or owners to personal sanctions such as (publicly enforced) criminal penalties or
(privately enforced) reputational penalties, including personal shaming and refusals to deal with
them in the future. These are poor substitutes for bonding assets, however, particularly when-as
with the shareholders in publicly held business corporations-the firm's owners are numerous and
constantly changing.
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designated pool of assets that are available to satisfy claims by the firm's
creditors. Legal entities are distinct from natural persons, however, in that
their bonding assets are, at least in part, distinct from assets owned by the
firm's owners or managers, in the sense that the finn's creditors have a
claim on those assets that is prior to that of the personal creditors of the
firm's owners or managers.
In our view, this latter feature-the separation between the firm's
bonding assets and the personal assets of the firm's owners and managers-
is the core defining characteristic of a legal entity, and establishing this
separation is the principal role that organizational law plays in the
organization of enterprise. More particularly, our argument has four
elements: (1) that a characteristic of all legal entities, and hence of
organizational law in general, is the partitioning off of a separate set of
assets in which creditors of the firm itself have a prior security interest;
(2) that this partitioning offers important efficiency advantages in the
creation of large firms; (3) that it would generally be infeasible to establish
this form of asset partitioning without organizational law; and (4) that this
attribute-essentially a property attribute-is the only essential contribution
that organizational law makes to commercial activity, in the sense that it is
the only basic attribute of a firm that could not feasibly be established by
contractual means alone.
III. FORMS OF ASSET PARTITIONING
Asset partitioning has two components. The first is the designation of a
separate pool of assets that are associated with the firm, and that are distinct
from the personal assets of the firm's owners and managers. In essence, this
is done by recognizing juridical persons (or, as we will usually say here,
"legal entities") that are distinct from individual human beings and that can
own assets in their own name. When a firm is organized as such an entity,
the assets owned by that entity in its own name become the designated
separate pool of firm assets.
The second component of asset partitioning is the assignment to
creditors of priorities in the distinct pools of assets that result from the
formation of a legal entity. This assignment of priorities takes two forms.
The first assigns to the firm's creditors a claim on the assets associated with
the firm's operations that is prior to the claims of the personal creditors of
the firm's owners. We term this "affirmative" asset partitioning, to reflect
the notion that it sets forth a distinct pool of firm assets as bonding assets
for all the firm's contracts. The second form of asset partitioning is just the
opposite, granting to the owners' personal creditors a claim on the owners'
separate personal assets that is prior to the claims of the firm's creditors.
We term this "defensive" asset partitioning, to reflect the common
2000]
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perception that it serves to shield the owners' assets from the creditors of
the firm.
Both forms are clearly illustrated by the typical business corporation.
Under the default rules established by corporate law, a corporation's
creditors have first claim on the corporation's assets-which is to say, their
claims must be satisfied before the corporation's assets become available to
satisfy any claims made against the corporation's shareholders by the
shareholders' personal creditors. This is affirmative asset partitioning.
Defensive asset partitioning, in turn, is found in the rule of limited liability
that bars the corporation's creditors from levying on the shareholders'
personal assets.
We should emphasize that, throughout our discussions of asset
partitioning, we use the term "creditors" quite broadly to include all
persons to whom there is owed a contractual obligation that has not yet
been fulfilled.
A. Affirmative Asset Partitioning
The type of affirmative asset partitioning that we see in the business
corporation can be termed "priority with liquidation protection." It not only
assigns to the corporation's creditors a prior claim on corporate assets, but
also provides that, if a shareholder becomes insolvent, the shareholder's
personal creditors cannot force liquidation of corporate assets to satisfy
their claims upon exhausting the shareholder's personal assets. Rather, a
shareholder's creditors at most can step into the shareholder's role as an
owner of shares-a role that generally offers the power to seek liquidation
only when at least a majority of the firm's shareholders agree. This type of
affirmative asset partitioning is found not only in business corporations but
also, for example, in cooperative corporations and limited liability
companies, and for the limited partners in a limited partnership.8
A weaker type of asset partitioning, priority without liquidation
protection, is afforded by the partnership at will, in which creditors of a
bankrupt partner generally have the power to force liquidation of the
partnership by foreclosing on the partner's interest in the partnership 9-
though if the partnership assets are insufficient to satisfy both individual
8. A limited partner's personal creditors generally cannot force dissolution of the partnership
or otherwise levy directly on partnership property, but can only accede to the bankrupt partner's
rights in distributions made by the partnership. Baybank v. Catamount Constr., 693 A.2d 1163
(N.H. 1997); ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 13.07(b)(2) (1999).
9. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (R.U.P.A.) § 801(6) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 103 (Supp.
2000); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (U.P.A.) § 32(2), 6 U.L.A. 804 (1995); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra
note 8, §§ 3.05(d)(3)(v), 7.06(f).
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and partnership creditors, then the creditors of the partnership itself have
priority over the partner's creditors in the assets of the partnership.' °
A stronger type of affirmative asset partitioning is found among firms
that are managed on behalf of beneficiaries who lack the complete earning
and control rights of full owners, including nonprofit corporations,
municipal corporations, charitable trusts, and spendthrift trusts. This form
gives to a firm's creditors not just a prior but (among creditors) an exclusive
claim on the entity's assets, in the sense that the creditors of a beneficiary
have no claim even to the beneficiary's interest in the firm. The
beneficiaries can continue to be beneficiaries even after they have gone
through personal bankruptcy, without passing to their creditors any portion
of their expected benefits from the firm.
Legal entities in which affirmative asset partitioning takes the form of
priority for business creditors without liquidation protection we will term,
for convenience, "weak-form legal entities." Entities exhibiting both
priority and liquidation protection we will term "strong-form legal
entities." Strong-form legal entities in which entity creditors get an
exclusive claim to the entities' assets we will term "super-strong-form legal
entities."
B. Defensive Asset Partitioning
There are various degrees of defensive asset partitioning, just as there
are degrees of affirmative asset partitioning. Indeed, the range and variety
we observe among forms of defensive asset partitioning is far greater than
what we observe in affirmative asset partitioning.
The strongest type of defensive asset partitioning is that found in the
standard business corporation, in which creditors of the firm have no claim
at all upon the personal assets of the firm's shareholders, which are pledged
exclusively as security to the personal creditors of the individual
shareholders. This exclusive type of defensive asset partitioning, generally
referred to simply as "limited liability," also characterizes other standard
types of corporations-nonprofit, cooperative, and municipal-as well as
limited liability companies.
At the other extreme lies the contemporary U.S. general partnership,"
in which there is no defensive asset partitioning at all; partnership creditors
share equally with the creditors of individual partners in distributing the
separate assets of partners when both the partnership and its partners are
10. R.U.P.A. § 807(a).
11. That is, the modem general partnership under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994), and the R.U.P.A.
2000]
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insolvent. Indeed, as the latter example indicates, defensive partitioning is
not required for the formation of a legal entity.
Between these two extremes lie a variety of intermediate degrees of
defensive asset partitioning that are, or once were, in common use. One of
these is illustrated by the traditional approach to partnerships prior to the
1978 Bankruptcy Act. Under that approach, partnership creditors could levy
on the assets of individual partners, but their claims were subordinated to
the claims of the partners' personal creditors. 2 A second is a rule of pro rata
personal liability, under which owners are liable without limit for the debts
of the firm, but bear this liability in proportion to their claims on the firm's
distributions. This rule-which was in fact applied to all corporations in
California from 1849 until 1931 3-implies, for example, that a five-percent
shareholder is personally liable, without limit, for five percent of any
corporate debts that cannot be satisfied out of the corporation's own assets.
A third intermediate form is a rule of multiple liability, exemplified by the
rules of double and triple liability that were applied to many U.S. banks in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, under which the personal
assets of a shareholder are exposed to liability for the firm's unpaid
obligations up to a limit equal to the par value (or, in the case of triple
liability, twice the par value) of the shareholder's stock in the firm. 4 A
fourth alternative, illustrated by the "companies limited by guarantee"
provided for in the law of the United Kingdom and some other
Commonwealth countries, permits individual owners to make specific
pledges of the amount for which they will be personally liable for a firm's
unpaid debts.' 5
C. Patterns of Partitioning
The standard-form legal entities that we observe today involve different
combinations of affirmative and defensive asset partitioning. Table 1
categorizes a few of the most common types of legal entities in these terms,
and also includes, for comparison, the sole proprietorship, in which the firm
is not a separate legal entity.
12. This approach applies even today for the liquidation outside of bankruptcy of partnerships
still governed by the old U.P.A.
13. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND
OTHER LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS
§ 2.01.1, at 42-46 (1987); Mark I. Weinstein, Limited Liability in California: 1928-1931
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal), available at http://marshallinside.
usc.edu/mweinstein/research.hul (version of Sept. 15, 2000).
14. For extensive discussion, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability
of Bank Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1992).
15. PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 10-11 (6th ed.
1997).
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TABLE 1. ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS AND CREDITORS' PRIORITIES
Affirm'ative ' Defensive
Type of Legal Identity Partitioning: Partitioning:
Firm Creditors' Owner's Creditors'
Claim on Claim on
Fim's Assets. Owner's Assets
Nonprofit Corporation
Municipal Corporation Exclusive Exclusive
Spendthrift Trust
Business Corporation Prior with
Cooperative Corporation Liquidation Exclusive
Limited Liability Company Protection
Limited Partnership
Prior with Prior (pre-1978)
Partnership for a Term Liquidation Shared (post-1978)
Protection
Prior Without Prior (pre-1978)
Partnership at Will Liquidation Shared (post-1978)
Protection
Shared Without
Sole Proprietorship Liquidation Shared
Protection
Various other patterns of affirmative and defensive asset partitioning,
beyond those included in Table 1, can also be found. Interesting examples
are provided, for example, by the law of marriage, where the pattern of
partitioning differs substantially from state to state. 16
16. Among states that have adopted the community property approach to marital property
law, there are a variety of different patterns of partitioning between the property of the marriage
and the separate property of the individual spouses. 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 37.13(b)(4)-(5) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). The following table offers illustrations, based
largely on Thompson's. Among the states in the table, Wisconsin and Arizona clearly establish
marriage as a legal entity, in the sense that they give marriage creditors priority in (indeed, an
exclusive claim on) marital assets. California, conversely, actually gives marital property less
protection from the separate creditors of the individual spouses than would be available to
property owned jointly by the spouses if they were not married, since it grants a separate creditor
of an individual spouse the right to proceed against all of the marital property, and not just the
individual spouse's share. Thus, in California, marriage might be considered an "anti-entity."
2000]
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D. Partitioning with Respect to a Firm's Managers
The preceding discussion has focused on partitioning between the
assets of a firm and the assets of the firm's owners. Partitioning between the
assets of the firm and the assets of the firm's managers is also important,
however. Here the pattern established by organizational law is quite
uniform. In nearly all standard-form legal entities, both affirmative and
defensive asset partitioning with respect to managers follow a rule of
exclusivity: The firm's assets are not available to satisfy the manager's
personal obligations, and the manager's personal assets are not available to
satisfy the firm's obligations. While we generally take this rule for granted,
the importance that organizational law plays in establishing this pattern will
become evident when we discuss the law of trusts below.
IV. BENEFITS OF AFFIRMATIVE ASSET PARTITIONING
Asset partitioning plays several distinct roles in the functioning of legal
entities that are critical to the interests of both the creditors and the owners
of these entities. We examine those roles here, with special focus on the
functional contributions made by affirmative asset partitioning. In
particular, we consider how affirmative asset partitioning reduces the cost
of credit for legal entities by reducing monitoring costs, protecting against
premature liquidation of assets, and permitting efficient allocation of risk.
In important respects, defensive asset partitioning is just the mirror
image of affirmative asset partitioning: Defensive partitioning with respect
to claims by the firm's creditors is effectively affirmative partitioning with
respect to claims by the owners' creditors. Consequently, the efficiency
advantages of affirmative asset partitioning described here also apply in
large part to defensive asset partitioning. But the symmetry is not perfect.
MARITAL ASSET PARTITIONING IN SELECTED COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES
Aftimatve aniionng:Defensive Partitioning:




New Mexico Shared Without Liquidation Shared
Protection
Shared (with Respect to Entirety
California of Marital Property) Without Exclusive?
Liquidation Protection I
Another common organizational form whose status as a legal entity has varied over time and
from state to state is the unincorporated association, discussed infra note 36.
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Defensive asset partitioning serves some special purposes of its own, which
we examine separately in Part VI.
A. Reducing Monitoring Costs
The potential economies offered by asset partitioning are most clearly
seen by considering subpartitioning of assets within a single firm.
Consequently, we begin with that case. We then turn to the more important
and familiar use of affirmative asset partitioning, namely, to partition the
business assets of a firm from the personal assets of the firm's multiple
owners.
1. Subpartitioning Assets Within a Single Firm: Corporate
Subsidiaries
Imagine a company that is engaged in two distinct lines of business:
ownership and management of a chain of hotels, and ownership and
management of oil fields and refineries. Then consider two distinct ways in
which these entities could be structured: (1) as a single corporation with
two operating divisions, one for the hotel business and one for the oil
business; (2) as two distinct corporations, one for the hotel business and one
for the oil business, both of which are wholly owned by a single parent
holding company that has no separate assets of its own, but simply holds all
of the stock of the two subsidiary corporations. In terms of decisionmaking
authority, the two structures are essentially identical: In each, the board of
directors of the parent firm has complete control over both the oil business
and the hotel business. Likewise, the company's aggregate assets are the
same in both cases. Yet the choice between these two structures may have a
large effect on overall costs. In particular, the structure in which the two
operating divisions are separately incorporated may face a substantially
lower cost of credit.
The reason is that the two lines of business are likely to depend, to a
significant degree, on two distinct classes of creditors. (Again, we use the
term "creditor" here and throughout to refer not just to persons to whom
the firm is indebted in monetary terms, but to any person to whom the firm
has an outstanding contractual obligation.) This is most obvious with
respect to trade creditors. A lessor of real estate or a supplier of linens to the
hotel business, for example, is likely to be in a relatively good position to
judge the financial viability of the hotel operation. To begin with, the
supplier may also deal with other hotel chains, and thus be continually well-
informed about the overall prospects of the hotel industry. In addition,
through its repeated dealings with the particular hotel chain in question, the
supplier is likely to know a great deal about how sound that chain is
20001
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financially and how well it is managed. Such a supplier to the hotel
business is not likely, however, to know much about the oil industry, either
in general or as administered by the particular company that also owns and
operates the hotel chain.
If the hotel business is operated as a separately incorporated subsidiary,
then the hotel supplier need not be much concerned about the prospects of
the oil business. Even if the company's oil operation becomes insolvent,
there will be little effect on the ability of the hotel subsidiary to pay its
debts. The same, conversely, is true for suppliers to the oil operation: They
need not concern themselves with screening and monitoring the fortunes of
the hotel operation. Indeed, this is also true for customers of the oil business
who hold long-term supply contracts and consequently have a strong
interest in the business's continued solvency.
If the hotel and oil operations are conducted as part of a single
corporate entity, however, then suppliers to the hotel business will always
run the risk that unexpected developments in the oil business will impair the
security of their credit, and vice versa for suppliers (and some customers) of
the oil operation. It follows that both sets of suppliers are likely to extend
credit on more favorable terms if the hotel and oil operations are separately
incorporated, so that the suppliers are spared the costs of monitoring
business activities with which they are unfamiliar.17
There are, of course, costs to partitioning the assets of a single firm by
subincorporation. One is that formal bankruptcy proceedings, and the
transaction costs associated with them, are more likely to arise as asset
pools become smaller and more homogeneous. Both the hotel operation and
the oil operation in our example are more likely to become the subject of
bankruptcy proceedings if they are separately incorporated than if they are
organized simply as divisions within a single conglomerate corporate shell.
The latter form of organization offers the advantage of diversification as a
bankruptcy-prevention device. 8
Another potential cost of asset partitioning is the increased risk of
opportunism by the debtor. For example, if insolvency should threaten the
hotel subsidiary in our example, the holding company might be tempted to
drain assets from that subsidiary to the parent corporation or to the oil
subsidiary, hence effectively expropriating the creditors of the hotel
17. The same logic applies if the hotel and oil businesses are simply spun off as separate
companies with different sets of stockholders rather than held by a single parent company.
18. This rationale for the conglomerate form is well-known from the finance literature. James
M. Gahlon & Roger D. Stover, Diversification, Financial Leverage and Conglomerate Systematic
Risk, 14 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 999 (1979); Haim Levy & Marshall Sarnat,
Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the Uneasy Case for Conglomerate Mergers, 25 J. FIN.
795 (1970); Wilbur G. Lewellen, A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger, 26 J.
FIN. 521 (1971); Ronald W. Melicher & David F. Rush, Evidence on the Acquisition-Related
Performance of Conglomerate Firms, 29 J. FIN. 141 (1974).
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business. Various legal doctrines-including fraudulent conveyance, veil-
piercing, minimum legal capital, and equitable subordination-are designed
to reduce the potential for this kind of opportunism. Nevertheless, these
protections are by no means perfectly effective, and they bring
administrative and incentive costs of their own.
Asset partitioning will reduce the overall costs of credit only when its
benefits outweigh such disadvantages. In general, it appears that the more
distinct the business operations involved, the more likely it is that
partitioning will be efficient.
The idea that partitioning a fixed pool of assets can reduce overall costs
of credit by reducing monitoring costs is already familiar.19 In large part,
however, the existing literature on this subject focuses on devices for asset
partitioning other than organizational law (for example, security interests")
or, when it does look at organizational law, focuses just on the law's role in
establishing defensive asset partitioning-that is, limited liability for a
firm's owners vis-a-vis a firm's business creditors. 1 Our principal objective
here is to demonstrate the critical role played by organizational law in
establishing affirmative asset partitioning as a means of reducing the costs
of business contracting. The importance of that role becomes even more
clear when we examine firms with multiple owners.
2. Partitioning Between a Firm and Its Individual Owners
The hotel and oil example is useful because it illustrates in reasonably
clear isolation the potential monitoring-cost advantages of asset
partitioning. Since the assets in the example are under the same common
management and ownership with or without partitioning, other incentive
issues are largely unaffected. This simple common ownership structure,
however, also makes the potential efficiency advantages of partitioning
relatively modest; such partitioning by subincorporation will be cost-
effective only in particular circumstances.2
19. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and
Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Richard Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated
Corporations. 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976).
20. E.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 19.
21. See, for example, Posner, supra note 19, who offers an example very much like our oil
and hotel business but employs it only to illustrate the utility of respecting limited liability among
affiliated corporations.
22. One such circumstance involves large-scale capital development projects of the type that
have commonly been organized under the increasingly popular "project finance" approach. The
projects involved are, for example, capital infrastructure projects in developing countries that
involve construction and operation of facilities such as telecommunications networks; railroads, or
toll roads. Equity financing and management of the project is provided by a sponsoring
corporation with relevant expertise that also operates other projects or businesses and may have its
principal operations outside the country where the project is located. Most financing for the
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The advantages of asset partitioning, and particularly of affirmative
asset partitioning, are far more obvious in the case of a business firm that
has numerous individuals as owners. In the absence of affirmative asset
partitioning, creditors of any single owner would have the right to proceed
against that owner's share of the firm's assets in case of the individual's
insolvency. As a consequence, potential creditors of the firm itself would
have difficulty determining the appropriate terms on which to extend credit.
Intimate familiarity with the firm's own assets and business affairs would
not suffice to determine the firm's creditworthiness; knowledge of the
personal creditworthiness of each of the firm's owners would be necessary
as well. Moreover, if a creditor's relationship with the firm were to extend
over any considerable period of time, the creditor would need to keep
monitoring the creditworthiness, not only of the firm itself, but also
of all of its individual owners. And, if the nature and number of
the firm's owners were to change over time-as they commonly do with
business corporations-the creditor would need to keep assessing the
creditworthiness of the new owners.
Clearly, the costs of such monitoring would often be enormously
high-so high, presumably, that creditors frequently would be unwilling to
incur them. Rather, potential creditors of the firm would simply increase the
cost of credit to compensate for the high uncertainty they must face, or just
deny credit entirely.
This becomes all the more obvious when one considers that it is not just
the personal financial affairs of the individual owners that would be
relevant to a potential firm creditor, but also the affairs of any other
businesses in which the owners had an equity investment. Thus, suppose
that-in a firm without asset partitioning-firm A were to have among its
owners individual X, who also had an ownership stake in firms B, C, and D.
Someone considering doing business with firm A would need to consider
not only the probability that A would mismanage his personal finances in a
fashion that would render him insolvent, but also that any of firms B, C, or
D might for any reason fail, with the result that the creditors of the failed
firm would seek to foreclose, via their claims against X, on X's share in A.
Nor is it just potential creditors of the firm that would have an interest
in the status of each owner's personal and other business affairs. All owners
project is provided by loans from one or more public or private lending institutions. The project is
organized through the formation of a separate corporation-a subsidiary of the sponsoring
corporation-that owns the project assets and receives the project revenues. The loans that finance
the project are obligations of the latter corporation, and not of the parent sponsoring corporation.
This arrangement is chosen self-consciously to permit the project lenders to confine their
evaluation and monitoring to the project in question, free of credit risks from the sponsor's other
obligations, and conversely to keep the project from directly affecting the creditworthiness
of the sponsor. See ESTEBAN BULJEVICH & YOON PARK, PROJECT FINANCING AND THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 87-95, 121-29 (1999).
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of the firm would have a similar interest, since they would bear the
consequences in terms of the firm's cost of credit. Mutual monitoring
among the individual owners of a firm may make sense in a small
partnership with stable membership, but it is obviously less efficient in
firms that, as with much medium and large-scale enterprise today, have a
numerous and constantly changing class of owners.23
Affirmative asset partitioning eliminates much of the risk that a firm's
finances will be affected by unrelated changes in the personal and business
affairs of its owners. It assures that the creditors of a firm will have first
right to the assets of that firm against any personal creditors, or other
business creditors, of the firm's owners. Defensive asset partitioning, such
as the limited liability of the type we see in the modem business
corporation, is neither necessary nor sufficient for this form of partitioning.
Even if organizational law offered only the contemporary partnership,
which offers affirmative asset partitioning but no defensive asset
partitioning, first priority claim on any firm's assets could easily be pledged
to that firm's creditors alone.
3. Protecting the Firm's Going Concern Value
As the last statement suggests, many of the monitoring-cost advantages
of affirmative asset partitioning can be obtained simply with the weak form
of affirmative asset partitioning found in partnerships, which grants to
creditors of the firm priority of claims but no liquidation protection vis-A-
vis the owners' personal creditors. So long as a firm's own creditors have a
prior claim on firm assets, there is a substantial limit to the threat that can
be presented to them by any effort of the owners' personal creditors to
liquidate firm assets. Nevertheless, absent liquidation protection, some
threat still remains.
That threat lies principally in the possibility that partial or complete
liquidation of the firm's assets could destroy some or all of the firm's going
concern value, with the result that, even if the firm were to remain solvent
after a partial liquidation, the net value left to the firm's owners, and
available as security for the firm's creditors, might well be reduced. If this
loss of firm value exceeded the value of the foreclosing personal creditor's
claim, then it of course would be open to the firm to buy out that claim. But
this would require that the firm be sufficiently liquid. Moreover, a personal
creditor with a right to foreclose on firm assets might well threaten to
23. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 89 (1985), emphasized some time ago that limited liability-a form of defensive
asset partitioning-has the benefit of reducing the need for a corporation's shareholders to
monitor the finances of their fellow shareholders. What we wish to point out here is that similar
monitoring economies result from affirmative asset partitioning as well.
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exercise that right and destroy substantial going concern value---even if he
could realize little or nothing thereby because the firm lacks sufficient net
worth-simply to hold up the firm (or its owners or creditors) for a sum
larger than his claim on the firm would receive if he actually foreclosed.24
For these reasons, even with the weak form of asset partitioning that
offers priority of claims but no liquidation protection, both the firm's
creditors and its owners would be at the mercy of, and have an incentive to
seek to monitor, the personal and other business affairs of all of the firm's
owners-a burden that would often be inefficient for them to bear. It is
understandable, then, that the dominant form of affirmative asset
partitioning among legal entities today is the strong form, in which firm
creditors are given not just priority in firm assets but also liquidation
protection.25
4. Risk Sharing
The foregoing discussion has focused largely on monitoring-that is,
efficient incentives for gathering and using information. But asset
partitioning can also be used to apportion risk among owners and creditors
in various patterns according to their relative costs of bearing that risk-
costs that will be affected by factors such as liquidity and diversification.
This is a familiar benefit of limited liability and other forms of defensive
asset partitioning. It is also an important benefit, however, of affirmative
asset partitioning, which substantially isolates a firm's creditors from risks
not associated with the fortunes of the firm.
5. The Corporation Sole
As the oil and hotel example illustrates, efficient asset partitioning may
often involve formation of a corporation with a sole shareholder-a
"corporation sole." That single shareholder may be another corporation, as
in the example. But use of the corporation sole for asset partitioning may
also be efficient where the shareholder is an individual, and the individual
(and her personal creditors) find it most convenient to segregate her
personal assets from her business assets for purposes of pledging those
assets as credit. Opposition to the "corporation sole" as an acceptable legal
24. This point is well-understood in partnership law, where liquidation by creditors is
possible. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 8, § 6.02(c).
25. Even in general partnerships at will, which as a general rule lack liquidation protection,
the courts are sensitive to the desirability of preserving going concern value, and for this reason
will generally decree foreclosure on an interest in a partnership only as a last resort. See 91st St.
Joint Venture v. Goldstein, 691 A.2d 272 (Md. 1997); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 8,
§ 3.05(d)(3)(v).
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form-an opposition that has largely died out in the United States 26 but
continues in some civil-law jurisdictions-stems from a failure to
appreciate this important asset partitioning function of the corporate form.
Although the term "corporation" may suggest a collective entity, the
rationale for the form of asset partitioning established by the business
corporation does not depend on collective ownership of the firm, and there
is no reason to insist on collective ownership when employing that form.
B. Preserving the Assets of Beneficiaries
As we noted in Part III, a few legal entities deploy a form of affirmative
asset partitioning even stronger than priority with liquidation protection-
namely, exclusive partitioning that denies the separate creditors of a firm's
owners (or, more accurately for the firms involved, the firm's beneficiaries)
any claim on the assets of the firm. Principal examples of these legal
entities are nonprofit corporations, municipal corporations, charitable trusts,
and spendthrift trusts.
One rationale for exclusivity is paternalism, as the example of the
spendthrift trust suggests. The settlor of the trust, while giving up all claims
on the trust assets for himself and his own creditors, wishes to protect the
trust's assets from the possibly reckless spending habits of the beneficiary,
and thus provides that trust assets are unavailable to the beneficiary's
creditors. A similar paternalistic rationale may be present in charitable
trusts and, to the extent they are redistributive, municipal corporations. A
second rationale for denying personal creditors any claim on the assets of
these entities is that in many cases the beneficiaries' expected benefits from
the firm would be extremely difficult to value and virtually impossible to
levy on as a practical matter. What is the value of municipal services to a
given resident, for example, and how might that value be monetized to
repay a debt?
Exclusivity is a far more common rule in defensive asset partitioning
than it is in affirmative asset partitioning, as Table 1 illustrates. We explore
the reasons for this in Part VI, in which we discuss defensive asset
partitioning more thoroughly.
26. This opposition continues with respect to the "LLC Sole," as reflected in the recent
Massachusetts statute. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, § 2(5) (West 2000) (requiring
LLCs to have two or more members), with UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 202(a), 6A U.L.A. 443
(1995) (expressly permitting single-member LLCs).
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V. CONSTRUCTING ENTITIES WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONAL LAW
In the absence of organizational law, it would be effectively impossible
to create the affirmative asset partitioning that is the core characteristic of a
legal entity. While in theory the pattern of rights that constitute affirmative
asset partitioning might still be established through contracting, the
transaction costs necessary to accomplish this would be prohibitive.
To understand these transaction costs, we explore here the methods that
might be employed to create the functional equivalent of a legal entity using
only the basic tools of property law, contract law, and agency law.2' That is,
we ask how difficult it would be to establish affirmative asset partitioning if
society lacked those special bodies of statutory and decisional law that
constitute the separate law of partnerships, business corporations, private
trusts, and so forth. By this means, we can see more clearly what makes
organizational law distinctive and important.
A. Single-Owner Enterprise
It is easiest and most instructive to begin with the simplest possible
case, in which a single individual owns and operates a business as a sole
proprietor. Suppose that this entrepreneur wishes to partition off the assets
associated with the business into a separate pool in which his business
creditors will be given a prior claim over his personal creditors-that is, he
wishes to undertake affirmative asset partitioning. If the law of business
corporations were available, this could of course be accomplished easily:
The entrepreneur would simply incorporate his business, transferring to the
corporation his title to the business assets in exchange for the corporation's
stock. This would result in the desired asset partitioning without interfering
with the entrepreneur's control over the business, which, as sole
shareholder in the corporation, he would continue to exercise as before.
It would not be practicable, however, to accomplish the same result
without incorporating the business or otherwise relying upon organizational
law. We can see this by considering how our hypothetical entrepreneur
might try to establish affirmative asset partitioning simply by contract.
(Since our focus for the moment is on affirmative, rather than defensive,
asset partitioning, we assume that the entrepreneur is not concerned about
27. The concept of agency, in which a principal can authorize an agent to bind the principal
to contracts with third parties, is crucial to the construction of a nexus of contracts with any
appreciable scope, whether the juridical person that is the central node of that nexus is an
individual human being, a group of individuals, or an organization. It is interesting to ask whether
the legal doctrine of agency is primitive, or whether it would be feasible to construct the
functional equivalent of agency using other, more basic elements of contract doctrine. We do not
explore that question here, however, but rather take for granted that agency doctrine is in place.
[Vol. 110: 387
The Essential Role of Organizational Law
shielding his personal assets from his business creditors. We explore
contractual approaches to defensive asset partitioning in Part VII.)
1. Establishing Priority by Contract
The default rules of property and contract law in effect provide that,
absent contractual agreement to the contrary, each of the entrepreneur's
creditors has an equal-priority floating lien upon the entrepreneur's entire
pool of assets as a guarantee of performance. That is, the creditors each
have a shared property right of sorts in the entrepreneur's assets-a
contingent claim on the assets that can be exercised in case of the
entrepreneur's nonperformance." If we ignore the possibility of using
security interests-a topic to which we return below-the entrepreneur
cannot alter these rights simply by putting a term in his contracts with his
business creditors that promises them a prior claim, over his other creditors,
on the subset of the entrepreneur's assets that he uses in his business. The
entrepreneur's existing personal creditors already have a claim on those
assets that cannot be subordinated without those creditors' consent.
Moreover, so far as the entrepreneur's future nonbusiness creditors are
concerned, the law, absent explicit agreement to the contrary, will also
impose a default term in their contracts with the entrepreneur that gives
them, likewise, an equal-priority claim on the entrepreneur's assets in case
of default-a contractual commitment inconsistent with any prior claim that
the entrepreneur previously gave to his business creditors.
Consequently, to assure his business creditors a prior claim on his
business assets, the entrepreneur would need to promise them credibly that
he would obtain from all of his personal creditors, both past and future,
agreements subordinating their claims on the entrepreneur's business assets
to those of the entrepreneur's business creditors. Absent organizational law,
an entrepreneur would generally be both unwilling and unable to make a
credible promise of this sort. He would be unwilling because the costs of
obtaining the necessary subordination agreements would be prohibitive in
virtually any practical situation. He would be unable because his
compliance could not be monitored or bonded.
Consider first the simple transaction costs that the contracting in
question would involve. These would include the expense of drafting and
inserting appropriate provisions in all contracts between the entrepreneur
and his personal creditors on one side, and in all contracts between the
entrepreneur and his business creditors on the other. Those provisions
28. To be more precise, the creditors have a right to levy on the assets so long as they remain
in the pool of assets belonging to the entrepreneur: The claim floats in the sense that assets are
subjected to the claim when they become property of the entrepreneur and are released from the
claim when they are no longer his property.
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would not be simple. They would need to be crafted with sufficient detail
and precision to distinguish clearly the entrepreneur's business assets from
his personal assets, and to distinguish his business creditors-those entitled
to a prior claim on the business assets-from his personal creditors. In this
connection, we must remember that the business assets are likely to be a
large and shifting pool of tangible and intangible items, including
equipment, supplies, inventory, accounts receivable, supply contracts, credit
agreements, and trademarks. Moreover, beyond these drafting costs, there
would be the costs of bargaining with all of the entrepreneur's personal
creditors to secure their agreement and to determine, among other things,
the consideration necessary to offset those creditors' loss of security.
Even if the costs of obtaining the requisite subordination agreements
were worth incurring, however, the entrepreneur would find it virtually
impossible to assure his business creditors that he would in fact obtain
them. Although each of the entrepreneur's business creditors would have a
contractual right to insist that the entrepreneur obtain those agreements, that
right would generally be enforceable only against the entrepreneur-and
not against his personal creditors-in the event that the entrepreneur failed
to negotiate the requisite subordination term.
Thus, the entrepreneur and his business creditors would face an
enormous problem of moral hazard. The entrepreneur would have a strong
incentive not to obtain the necessary subordination agreements, particularly
in the circumstances in which they would be most important to the business
creditors-namely, when the entrepreneur is facing a substantial risk of
insolvency and hence is both (a) in strong need of further credit, and (b) in a
poor position to obtain credit that is subordinated. By failing to obtain a
subordination agreement with a personal creditor, the entrepreneur and the
personal creditor can externalize to the entrepreneur's business creditors a
larger portion of the potential costs of the entrepreneur's insolvency than
the business creditors had bargained for. For these reasons, in order for the
entrepreneur's business creditors to have faith in the entrepreneur's
compliance with his promise to give them priority in his business assets,
they would have to engage in continuous monitoring of the entrepreneur's
contracts with all of his individual creditors-a task that generally would be
infeasible.
Organizational law eliminates the need for such elaborate contracting
and thereby avoids the transaction costs and moral hazard it involves. First,
by permitting the firm itself to be an owner of assets, organizational law
provides a simple means for identifying which assets are to be considered
personal assets as opposed to business assets: The latter are simply the
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assets to which an appropriately organized firm holds title.29 Second,
organizational law provides a simple means for distinguishing the
individual's personal creditors from his business creditors: The latter are
simply those whose contracts are with an appropriately organized firm
rather than with the individual directly. Third, and most importantly,
organizational law alters the default rules of contract law by imposing a
special term in every contract that a person enters into with a personal
creditor. That term provides, in effect, that if (a) that person transfers assets
to an appropriately organized firm owned by that person, or (b) that person
purchases assets in the name of an appropriately organized firm that he
owns rather than in his own name, then his personal creditor's claim on
those assets will be subordinated to the claims of the business creditors with
whom he has contracted in the name of the firm.
This special contractual term that organizational law imposes is,
moreover, a mandatory term. If it were just a default term, waivable by the
parties, then the problems of moral hazard discussed above would return. A
business creditor would have difficulty assuring that his claim was in fact
prior to those of all of the personal creditors of the firm's owner, since the
owner might have waived the term in question for the benefit of some or all
of that owner's personal creditors.
2. Efficiency Concerns
This altered pattern of contractual rights that organizational law
establishes would not be useful, of course, if it were not efficient-that is, if
it did not lead to an increase in the aggregate value of the contractual rights
held by all parties concerned. In general, one can expect not only that it will
be efficient, but also that the individual transactions that it facilitates will be
to the advantage of all the contracting parties involved.
Consider, again, our hypothetical entrepreneur. Suppose that he has
already incorporated his business and now wishes to transfer to the business
a piece of equipment that was previously his personal property. In
exchange, he will receive additional shares in the corporation (or perhaps, if
he is the sole shareholder, simply an increase in the value of his existing
shares). As a consequence of this transaction, his personal creditors will
lose the right to levy directly on the equipment and will receive, in place of
that right, an increase in the value of the entrepreneur's shares that they can
levy on. The creditor-monitoring economies and other advantages of
affirmative asset partitioning, however, should render that increase in share
29. Of course, in the case of small, informal entities such as general partnerships, there may
still be ambiguity on the margin as to which property belongs to the firm and which belongs to
individual partners. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 3.02-.03.
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value greater than the value that the equipment had when it was owned
personally by the entrepreneur. If it were otherwise, the entrepreneur would
have had little incentive to transfer the equipment to the corporation.
Thus, the transaction should redound to the benefit of all involved-the
entrepreneur's personal creditors, the entrepreneur himself, and the
entrepreneur's business creditors. The same logic applies, moreover, when
an entrepreneur originally incorporates a business that was previously
operated as a sole proprietorship. In sum, affirmative asset partitioning is a
bonding mechanism-a means of pledging assets to business creditors-
that the entrepreneur generally has an incentive to use only when its
benefits exceed its costs, from both an individual and a social point of view.
B. Multiple-Owner Enterprises
When a business has multiple owners, the costs of establishing
affirmative asset partitioning by simple contracting-already prohibitive in
the case of a single owner-grow exponentially, while at the same time the
benefits of affirmative asset partitioning also increase dramatically. This
becomes clear when we imagine how a group of numerous individuals
might try to create a jointly owned business with affirmative asset
partitioning-the sort of firm that could be formed using partnership law or
corporate law-if partnership law, corporate law, and other forms of
organizational law did not exist.
Basic property law would permit these individuals to purchase and own
the property used in the business jointly, as tenants in common. Basic
agency law would permit the co-owners to delegate to managers well-
defined authority to act on behalf of the owners and to commit, as security
for performance of the business's contracts, both the jointly owned assets
used in the business and the individual owners' personal assets. And basic
contract law would permit the co-owners to commit themselves both to
their chosen methods for apportioning among themselves the earnings of
the enterprise, and to the voting rules or other mechanisms they will use to
make those decisions that are not delegated to the managers. Consequently,
using just these basic legal tools, the individuals could create a nexus of
contracts with many of the attributes of a partnership. What these
individuals could not practicably do is establish either of the two basic
elements of affirmative asset partitioning: priority of claims or liquidation
protection.
1. Establishing Priority
Consider first the problem of giving creditors of the business a prior
claim on the jointly owned assets used in the business. Under the
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background rules of contract and property law, the personal creditors of an
individual co-owner, in the case of the individual's nonperformance, would
be able to levy on all of the individual's assets, including his share in the
co-owned business property. And their claim on the latter property would
be equal in priority with that of the business creditors. Any effort to change
this pattern of creditors' rights would run into problems of the same
kinds explored above in the case of a single-owner enterprise, though
exponentially greater in magnitude.
In particular, to give the business creditors a prior claim to the assets
used in the business would require that each of the co-owners pledge, in
each contract with a business creditor, that they will extract from each of
their personal creditors-both those already existing as well as all future
personal creditors-a waiver of claims against the co-owners' share of the
business assets. These pledges might be made easily enough by the
managers, acting as their agent, via standard-form contracting. But the
transaction costs to the co-owners of complying with these pledges would
be immense-roughly the same as for the single owner we discussed
previously, but multiplied by the number of co-owners involved. Moreover,
the problems of moral hazard and monitoring involved in enforcing these
pledges would increase much more than proportionately to the number of
co-owners. The reason is that, with multiple co-owners, there arises a free-
rider problem. Each co-owner has a stronger incentive than would a single
owner-entrepreneur not to extract the promised waiver from one or more of
his personal creditors and thus effectively pledge to them his share of the
commonly-owned assets, since-holding the actions of the other co-owners
constant-he bears only part of the costs that such action imposes on the
creditworthiness of the business. Further, as the number of co-owners
increases, it becomes more difficult for the co-owners themselves to control
this problem by monitoring each other's private debts.
2. Liquidation Protection
In addition to the problem of establishing priority in business assets for
business creditors, there is the problem of liquidation protection. With only
basic property law to work with, liquidation protection would be difficult to
obtain. Each co-tenant of property held as tenancy in common has a right to
force partition of the property, either through physical partition (nominally
the law's preferred method) or through sale of the property and division of
the proceeds.3" Creditors of a bankrupt tenant in common step into the
30. E.g., Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 1980); Johnson v. Hendrickson,
24 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1946). Statutory law in most states includes provisions allowing this forced
partition. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 4.5 cmt. a (1983); JOHN E. CRIBBET.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 106 (1975). See generally Note, Partitions in Kind: A
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bankrupt person's shoes as tenant in common,3 and therefore presumably
have the same right to force partition. Although tenants in common can
enter into a contractual agreement among themselves not to partition the
property, such an agreement must be limited in duration.32 Moreover, it is
doubtful whether an agreement not to partition, whatever its duration,
would bind the cotenants' creditors.33
3. Partnership as Partitioning
The law of partnership solves the problem of granting creditors a prior
claim on the assets of the firm, and hence permits the weak form of
affirmative asset partitioning, by creating a special form of concurrent
tenancy for all assets held in partnership name. (A partner is said to hold
partnership assets as a "tenant in partnership" under the old Uniform
Partnership Act.') The rules of creditors' rights and bankruptcy applied to
partnership provide that creditors of the partnership have a claim on these
partnership assets, in case of the partnership's insolvency, that is prior to
the claims of the partners' personal creditors.3
From the functional view of legal entities that we take here, it is this
feature of partnership law that makes the partnership a legal entity rather
than a mere common agency, and thus makes partnership law part of
organizational law. There has long been debate in the legal literature as to
whether the partnership, at one or another point in its historical evolution,
should properly be considered to have attained legal personality. Those who
have argued to the contrary have pointed, for example, to the fact that until
relatively recently, it was necessary to name all of a firm's individual
partners in a lawsuit to enforce a claim against the partnership, or to the
Preference Without Favor, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 855 (1986) (surveying and criticizing the law's
preference for partition in kind).
31. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 38 (1995) (citing New Haven Trolley
& Bus Employees Credit Union v. Hill, 142 A.2d 730 (Conn. 1958); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Lewis, 218 N.Y.S.2d 857 (App. Div. 1961); and Sipes v. Sanders, 66 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1933)); see also 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 13 (1997) (discussing the sale or
conveyance of common property to a third person).
32. An agreement not to partition is unenforceable as an invalid restraint on alienation unless
it is for a reasonable time only. Raisch v. Schuster, 352 N.E.2d 657, 659-60 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.5, reporter's note 2(c)
(1983); see also CRIBBET, supra note 30, at 106 (citing Michalski v. Michalski, 142 A.2d 645
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958)).
33. The Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee in bankruptcy to sell both the interest of a
bankrupt debtor and the interest of a co-owner in property that the parties held as tenants in
common. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (1994). This provision of the Code makes no reference to
agreements not to partition, and it seems implausible that they would be considered relevant. The
same Code provision, for example, applies to property held as tenancy by the entirety, in which by
law, and not just as a contractual option, an individual co-owner lacks the right to compel
partition.
34. U.P.A. § 25,6 U.L.A. 699 (1995).
35. The rule is stated quite explicitly, for example, in id.
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traditional rule that a change in the membership of the partnership leads to a
dissolution of the partnership. While such elements of the traditional law of
partnership are inconveniences for a smoothly functioning firm, they are
only that; in general, they can be avoided by contractual means. The
priority of claims that partnership law establishes for the firm's creditors is
of a different character, since it could not, as a practical matter, be
established by contract.36
If the owners of a firm want liquidation protection, the general
partnership at will, of course, will not suffice. Rather, the owners will need
to use a strong-form legal entity, such as the business corporation.
C. An Aside on the "Partnership Sole"
Once this last point is recognized, we see that it would make sense for
partnership law to recognize the "partnership sole" -that is, a partnership
with only a single partner-just as corporation law has come to recognize
the corporation sole. With the ability to establish a business as a partnership
sole, an individual entrepreneur could give all of her business creditors a
prior claim on her business assets while also offering them a claim against
36. Like the partnership, the unincorporated association has long been the subject of debate
as to its status as a legal entity. In the case of the unincorporated association, however, there has
been more reason for debate.
The traditional common-law rule was that an unincorporated association could not hold
assets in its own name. As a result, there existed no separate pool of association assets against
which creditors of the association could proceed. Creditors of the association who sought
satisfaction of their claims consequently were permitted to bring suit against members and other
persons acting on behalf of the association. An unincorporated association was therefore not a
legal entity as we use that term here.
Beginning in the early twentieth century, many states adopted "sue and be sued" statutes
recognizing the capacity of an unincorporated association to hold assets and incur debts in its own
name, with the result that creditors of the association could reach the assets of the association to
satisfy unpaid debts. Those statutes consequently established affirmative asset partitioning, and
thus made unincorporated associations legal entities in the sense used here. To be sure, affirmative
asset partitioning requires not only demarcation of the firm's assets, but also creation of a priority
claim on those assets for firm creditors. The statutes in question do not expressly address the latter
question of priority. Nevertheless, priority for association creditors is the logical consequence of
the statutes: Assets held by the association are presumably not also to be considered personal
property of the members, and thus cannot be levied upon directly by creditors of the individual
members.
The sue-and-be-sued statutes did not, however, establish defensive asset partitioning.
Members, as well as others acting on behalf of the association, remained personally liable, jointly
and severally, for the association's debts. Karl Rove & Co. v. Thornburgh, 39 F.3d 1273, 1285-86
(5th Cir. 1994); see Kimberly A. Davison, Note, Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church: Liability Issues
of the Unincorporated Association, Is It Time for the Legislature To Step In ? 46 BAYLOR L. REV.
231, 235-36 (1994). It was largely this issue that prompted the promulgation, in 1992, of the
Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act, 6A U.L.A. 509 (1995), which has now been
adopted in a number of states. That Act roughly replicates the affirmative asset partitioning
provisions of the sue-and-be-sued statutes, but goes further by establishing a substantial, though
ambiguous, degree of defensive asset partitioning, stating that a person is not personally liable for
an unincorporated association's debts "merely" because that person is a member of the
association or participates in its management. Davison, supra, at 254-56.
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her personal assets for any business debts that could not be satisfied out of
business assets. This form of affirmative asset partitioning without
defensive asset partitioning would have the same advantages for a small
business with a single owner as it does for one with two or more owners.
The fact that partnership law requires, instead, at least two partners37 is
perhaps explainable in part, like early resistance to the corporation sole, by
conceptual confusion: "Partnership," even more than "corporation," seems
to connote multiple owners. Another explanation may be that, at least
today, roughly the same result can be obtained by incorporating the
business and having its sole shareholder assume personal liability by
cosigning contracts between the corporation and its most important
creditors.
D. Agency with Title
In the preceding discussion, we assumed that the individuals investing
in the business would remain co-owners of the specific assets used in the
business. An alternative approach to establishing affirmative asset
partitioning without organizational law might be to transfer ownership of
those assets to the manager(s) of the business, subject to a contractual
commitment by the manager, acting as agent for the owners, to manage the
assets for the exclusive benefit of the owners and to reconvey the assets to
the owners under appropriate circumstances.
This approach would provide a relatively workable means of granting
business creditors a claim to the business assets that is prior to the claims of
the owners' personal creditors. Since title to the business assets would not
be in the hands of the owners, the owners' personal creditors would have no
right to levy on those assets. At most the owners' creditors could succeed to
the owners' contractual claims against the agent. But those claims, being
contractual, would be limited to the terms of the contracts. And the
contracts between the owners and the manager serving as their agent could
provide that claims of the owners against the assets held by the manager
would be subordinate to the claims of the business creditors with whom the
manager contracts.
Consequently, separate waivers from all the personal creditors of the
owners would not be necessary, thus avoiding the prohibitive transaction
costs and moral hazard that such waivers would involve. To make the
business creditors' priority credible to them, it would be sufficient to show
them the waivers in the agency contracts between the owners and the
manager.
37. At present, formation of a partnership requires "an association of two or more persons."
R.U.P.A. § 202(a), 6 U.L.A. 53 (Supp. 2000); U.P.A. § 6.
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Liquidation protection from the owners' personal creditors might also
be established through this approach. In case of an owner's personal
bankruptcy, his creditors could seek to realize the value of his contractual
commitments from the manager of the business, but presumably-at least
so long as the agency is not revocable 3 -- could pursue only a monetary
claim against the manager, and could not seek to levy directly on the
business assets whose title is held by the manager.
This approach may therefore succeed in insulating the pledged assets
from the creditors of the co-owners.39 The reason it succeeds is that the
owners in fact are employing a separate legal person to serve as the firm.
That person, however, is a real individual-the agent/manager-rather than
an artificial legal person. And therein lies the problem with this approach.
By borrowing the legal personality of the manager to form the firm, the
business assets held by the manager become indistinct from the manager's
personal property. The result is that the business assets, while insulated
from the creditors of the owners, are not insulated from the creditors of the
manager. Absent organizational law, the business assets would be, as a
default rule, available to the manager's personal creditors, unless the
manager secured explicit agreement from those creditors that the assets
would not be available to them.
The agency contract between the owners and the manager, to be sure,
could require that the manager obtain such an agreement from each of his
personal creditors. But the resulting transaction costs-which would
resemble those we surveyed when considering the possibility that a single
owner of a business could affirmatively partition off the assets of that
business-would commonly make such agreements impracticable.
Moreover, not only the creditors of the business, but also the owners, would
run the substantial risk that the manager would fail to obtain such an
agreement from one or more of his creditors, whether from opportunism or
mere inattention. In that case, while the owners (and perhaps the business
creditors) would retain contractual claims against the manager, those claims
would be parallel with, rather than superior to, the claims of the manager's
38. The general rule is that an agency cannot be made nonrevocable. There is an exception,
however, if the agency "is coupled with an interest." Presumably the transfer of title in the
pledged assets to the agent gives the agent the requisite interest (from the law's point of view). To
be sure, the agency contract employed here seeks to deprive the manager of any equitable interest
in the assets, leaving him only with formal legal title. On the other hand, as the following
discussion shows, there may be no way to prevent those assets from serving as security for the
manager's personal creditors, and thus the manager in fact does have a substantial equitable
interest in the assets.
39. As a bonus, this approach may also provide limited liability for the owners, in the sense
that their exposure to the creditors of the firm may be limited to the assets whose title they have
transferred to the manager. This will not be the case, however, if the owners retain sufficient
control over the manager that the law of agency makes them personally responsible for contracts
entered into by the agent on their behalf.
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personal creditors:,As a result, in the absence of organizational law, this
approach fails to establish affirmative asset partitioning, just as do the other
two approaches we have examined.
The common-law trust solves this problem of insulating the business
assets from the personal creditors of the manager by permitting the manager
to be designated a "trustee" whose assets-that is, assets to which he holds
legal title-are effectively partitioned into two sets: his personal assets, and
the assets he holds in trust for designated beneficiaries. Further, trust law
provides that, as a general rule, the latter assets are not available to satisfy
the claims of the trustee's personal creditors. Thus, the law of trusts makes
the trustee, vis-A-vis creditors with whom he contracts, two distinct legal
persons: a natural person contracting on behalf of himself, and an artificial
person acting on behalf of the beneficiaries.
This insulation of assets held in trust from the personal creditors of the
trustee is the essential contribution of trust law. Its importance can be seen
by examining the use of trust-like relationships in civil-law countries where
the law of trusts is lacking. While it is not uncommon in those jurisdictions
for individuals to proceed in the manner described above, transferring to an
agent the title to assets that the agent is to manage on the individuals'
behalf, the persons chosen as agents are almost invariably banks or other
institutions with sufficient safe assets effectively to eliminate the risk of the
agent's insolvency. This is in contrast to common-law jurisdictions where,
as a consequence of the law of trusts, individuals have long been commonly
used as trustees.4" While it is sometimes said that the common-law trust
lacks legal personality, in our view it is, on the contrary, quite clearly a
legal entity, and trust law is consequently a form of organizational law.
Indeed, one might go further. We have taken it for granted that, even in
the absence of trust law, the agency-with-title arrangement described here
would at least succeed in partitioning off the business assets held by the
manager from the personal assets of the owners. But that assumption is
based on legal rules that might themselves be considered to have the
character of organizational law. After all, the law might quite reasonably
say, instead, that an effort to transfer formal title in an asset from a principal
to an agent, when that agent remains subject to the control of the principal
and to a promise ultimately to reconvey the asset and the title to the
principal, does not succeed in changing the legal character of that asset as
property of the principal rather than of the agent, at least for purposes of
creditors' rights. Thus, the asset would remain available to the principal's
personal creditors just like other assets owned directly by the principal.
Viewed this way, the law of trusts is important not only for permitting
40. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998).
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affirmative partitioning of trust assets with respect to the personal assets of
the trustee, but also-like corporation law and partnership law-for
permitting affirmative partitioning with respect to the personal assets of the
owners.
E. Security Interests
It remains to ask whether affirmative asset partitioning might be
accomplished through contracting, without resort to organizational law, if
we supplement contract law rules with the modem law of secured
transactions, such as that found in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.).
Of the two principal components of affirmative asset partitioning-
priority of claims and liquidation protection-security interests offer a
potential substitute only for the first. They provide a mechanism for
assigning different priorities to the claims that different creditors hold on a
given set of assets, but they do not, in their contemporary form, offer a
means of preventing one or another class of creditors from forcing
liquidation of the assets in satisfaction of their claim. Consequently,
security interests can serve at most as an alternative to organizational law in
forming weak-form legal entities such as partnerships; they cannot suffice
for the construction of strong-form entities such as corporations. Moreover,
even with respect to priority of claims, security interests do not today offer
an effective substitute for organizational law.
1. Establishing Priority
To see the possibilities for using security interests to establish a priority
of claims, let us return to the case of a group of individuals who wish to
create a business that they will own jointly, and whose creditors will have a
prior claim, over those individuals' personal creditors, on assets associated
with the business. And let us suppose that the owners have at their disposal
the contemporary U.S. commercial law of security interests, but no
organizational law such as the law of partnership or the law of business
corporations (thus forcing the owners to employ a nonentity form of joint
ownership, such as tenancy in common).
To achieve their purposes using only the law of secured transactions,
our hypothetical owners might seek to draft and register a financing
agreement assigning to all business creditors an undivided security interest
in all present and future business assets, with the creditors' claims to be
satisfied out of the security pro rata according to the amount owed them.
This would require a reduction to writing of (1) a description of all of the
assets to be pledged, and (2) a listing of all of the present and future
2000]
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creditors to which these assets can be pledged. A statement pledging these
assets as security would then need to be included in the individual contracts
between the firm and each of its creditors. To be comprehensive, this class
of creditors would have to include all of the firm's suppliers, employees,
and customers. The essential question is whether the transaction costs of
accomplishing this would be prohibitive.
The current law of secured transactions permits the pledge of both
present and future (" after-acquired" ) assets by type. Consequently, it offers
a relatively simple method of establishing a broad floating lien over assets
held by a given debtor. To be sure, the most recent revisions to the U.C.C.
specifically forbid debtors from offering, in a security agreement, a blanket
pledge of all assets of any description, requiring instead more specific
description of the particular assets that are covered by the agreement. 1
Consequently, using just the law of secured transactions, business creditors
could not be given priority over the business owners' personal creditors in
assets of a type not specifically described. This clearly makes a security
agreement a relatively awkward means for affimative asset partitioning.
Since, however, most business assets of consequence can be described and
pledged effectively under current law, this problem is not a fundamental
obstacle to substantially effective asset partitioning via secured
transactions.
In contrast to the flexibility it offers in describing pledged assets,
however, current commercial law creates severe difficulties in describing
the creditors to whom those assets are to be pledged. A financing agreement
must list the name and address of each creditor who is secured by the
agreement.4" This means that a secured financing agreement cannot be
extended to include unnamed future business creditors without requiring a
new filing each time the firm deals with a new creditor. As one court has
put it, "the UCC clearly contemplates and sanctions floating collateral
(after-acquired property of the debtor) and floating debt (future
advances [from already existing creditors]). However, the UCC does
not.., contemplate floating secured parties .... "" Undertaking a new
filing with each new creditor-which means, to match the consequences of
organizational law, filing virtually every time that the firm contracts with
someone new-would obviously be an infeasible burden in a business of
any complexity. Consequently, security interests fall far short of offering a
41. In a new version of U.C.C. Article 9, recently drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, section 9-108 explicitly disallows such pledges in
security agreements (though the new section 9-504 specifically allows such a description in a
financing statement). U.C.C. §§ 9-108, 9-504 (2000).
42. U.C.C. § 9-402 (1992). Although the new section 9-502 dispenses with the requirement
that a financing statement include the creditor's address, "the name of the secured party" is still
required. U.C.C. § 9-502 (2000).
43. In re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366, 369 (5th Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 110: 387
The Essential Role of Organizational Law
workable substitute for establishing the pattern of priorities that is involved
in the affirmative asset partitioning offered by organizational law.
It might be argued that, while security interests cannot suffice to
provide priority of claims for all of the creditors of a business, this is not
really necessary to create a viable firm. Rather, it is sufficient if the
business simply obtains all of its credit from one big creditor rather than
from many small ones. In fact, small businesses commonly follow this path
today, obtaining most or all of their financing from a single creditor such as
a bank that takes a security interest in all of the business's assets.' If the
business goes bankrupt, the single secured creditor commonly gets paid
nearly in full, while the other, smaller creditors get little or nothing.4 5
Realizing this, the unsecured creditors can adjust their terms of credit
accordingly.
But this one-big-secured-creditor approach to creating a viable firm
suffers from two serious problems. First, it is not the case that, if a business
relies upon a single secured creditor for its principal financing, it is
irrelevant to other parties who contract with the firm whether the firm is
formed as a legal entity-that is, whether the business as a whole exhibits
affirmative asset partitioning. Other persons who contract with the business
(customers, suppliers, workers, etc.) will still need to assess the likelihood
that the firm will keep its contractual promises to them, so that they can
determine the terms on which they are willing to deal with the business.
This requires, in particular, an ability to predict the likelihood with which
the business will go bankrupt. For, even if (or especially if) it is clear to the
firm's customers and suppliers that they will get nothing from the firm in
the case of its bankruptcy, owing to the presence of the one, big secured
creditor, the probability of nonperformance (and nonpayment of damages)
remains important when deciding whether and on what terms to contract
with the business. And in the absence of affirmative asset partitioning, it
will be very much harder than it otherwise would be for the firm's
customers and suppliers to predict the likelihood of the business's
bankruptcy, since that will depend on the probability that each of the
business's owners will become insolvent, and not just on the probability
that the business itself will become unprofitable. In short, the monitoring-
cost advantages of affirmative asset partitioning do not disappear when a
firm depends principally on one large secured creditor for financial credit.
Second, there is the problem of how the business's one large creditor
will obtain its own financing in the absence of organizational law. Suppose,
for example, that-as is common for small businesses today-the one large
44. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901,
948-50 (1986) (discussing single creditor "relational" lending to small firms).
45. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1996).
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
creditor is a bank that obtains tie funds it lends by taking deposits from
numerous small depositors. In the absence of organizational law, and of the
affirmative asset partitioning it affords, the bank's depositors run the risk
that the bank will be thrown into bankruptcy by creditors of the bank's
owners even if the bank's own operations are highly profitable. Thus, to an
important degree, the one-big-secured-creditor approach just shifts the
problem of creditors' monitoring costs from the creditors of the business
itself to the creditors of the business's single secured creditor.
2. Respecting Priority
Beyond the problem of determining the pattern of priorities among a
business's creditors and the creditors of the business's owners, there is the
problem of determining how closely those priorities, once established, will
be respected. Here, too, there is a difference between what can be
accomplished with organizational law and what can be accomplished with
the law of secured interests. Organizational law offers stronger respect for
these priorities.
Bankruptcy law in the United States sometimes fails, in practice, to
give full respect to the relative priorities among the creditors of a business,
advantaging junior creditors and equityholders at the expense of senior
creditors.' To avoid this problem, some companies obtain debt financing
through the use of a separate entity. This approach is typified by the
asset securitization transactions that have become commonplace in recent
years.47
In a typical asset securitization transaction, a corporation transfers some
of its assets (say, its accounts receivable) to a wholly owned subsidiary
corporation created just for purposes of the transaction. The subsidiary in
turn issues bonds backed by the accounts receivable, paying the receipts
from the bond issue to the parent corporation as compensation for those
46. Undercompensation of secured creditors relative to general creditors and equity is, for
example, a direct consequence of the doctrine established in the Supreme Court's ruling in United
Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 484 U.S. 365 (1988), which disallows
interest on secured creditors' unpaid claims during bankruptcy proceedings. For a discussion, see
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 381-83 (3d ed. 2000).
For a general analysis of absolute-priority valuations, as well as the direct costs of
bankruptcy reorganization, see Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and
Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. EcON. 285 (1990); see also Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1990) (offering an empirical estimate of
deviations from absolute priority). See generally Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate
Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 343 (1997) (collecting sources on the theory and empirical
evidence of absolute-priority violations and the costs of reorganization).
47. On the popularity of these transactions, see INGO WALTER & ROY SMITH, GLOBAL
BANKING 201 fig.7-6 (1997); and John Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an
Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997).
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assets.48 In economic effect, the parent corporation is just borrowing against
its accounts receivable. Those assets are usually well within the categories
of assets in which security interests can easily be created. Consequently, the
same basic secured borrowing transaction might be undertaken without use
of the subsidiary by having the corporation itself issue the bonds and back
them with a security interest in the corporation's accounts receivable. The
advantage of using the subsidiary-which, though nominally a distinct legal
entity, typically performs no significant operational functions-is that it
serves as a "bankruptcy remote vehicle": If the parent corporation should
ever fall into bankruptcy, the trust assets will remain completely insulated
from the bankruptcy proceedings, reducing the risk that the priority of the
bondholders' claim on the pledged assets will be compromised.49 Even
greater bankruptcy remoteness can be obtained through a common variant
on such transactions in which the pledged assets are transferred, not to a
wholly owned subsidiary, but to a legal entity such as a trust that is, at least
nominally, completely separate from the corporation for whose benefit the
transaction is undertaken.50
The great popularity of these types of "structured finance" transactions
reflects the widespread belief that legal entities provide greater protection
than do security interests against the tendency of bankruptcy law to
compromise priorities among creditors and hence frustrate efficient asset
partitioning. To be sure, this advantage of legal entities over security
interests is arguably a relatively modest one. Moreover, it is in part just an
artifact of the weakness of U.S. bankruptcy law in respecting priorities-a
weakness not generally shared by other legal systems. The critical
advantage of legal entities over security interests today does not lie in the
degree of protection that they offer for established priorities, but rather, as
described in the preceding Subsection, in the greater facility that entities
offer to establish priorities in the first place.
48. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION, 16-36 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the structure and motivation of typical
securitization transactions); Comm. on Bankr. and Corporate Reorganization of the Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of N.Y., Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 538, 569 (1995)
[hereinafter Structured Financing Techniques] (describing vendor and lessor financing through
separate entities such as General Motors Acceptance Corporation).
49. SCHWARCZ, supra note 48, at 16-36; Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 48, at
553-67; Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
1061, 1090-93 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 133, 135 (1994); Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling
Theory, Practice, and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 310-11 (1997).
50. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 48, at 21-36.
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3. Adding Flexibility to Property Law
If the law of security interests were substantially more flexible, and
permitted the creation of floating liens with the appropriate scope and force,
and with substantial flexibility in accommodating shifting creditors, then
that body of law might provide a workable substitute for organizational law,
at least so far as establishing priority of claims is involved (though it still
would not provide liquidation protection).5 The reason for this is that both
organizational law and the law of security interests are at bottom, in
important part, forms of property law: They define the types of property
interests that can be created and made binding against third parties.
The underlying law of property rights in all economies places strong
limitations on the ways in which transferable property rights in any given
asset can be divided up among two or more persons. 2 Both the law of
security interests and organizational law create exceptions to these
limitations. They permit the grant of a contingent ownership right-a right
to take possession of the asset in case of contractual default-and make that
right enforceable against third parties, including, in particular, other
creditors who also have a contingent claim on the assets in question. An
important consideration in permitting creation of these rights is that third
parties who might be affected by the rights-such as other creditors whose
interests might be subordinated by them-have some form of notice. The
law of security interests provides for notice through means such as filing.
Organizational law provides for notice by permitting assignment of rights
only to assets held by a legal entity. When assets are held in the name of a
legal entity, the owners of that entity effectively give notice to personal
creditors that a prior contingent claim on those assets may well be held by
other persons-namely, creditors who have contracted with the entity itself.
4. Historical Evolution
The law of security interests, in its modem general form, is a relatively
recent innovation. Until well into the twentieth century, that body of law
was much less suited than it is now to creating broad floating liens of a type
that offer a partial substitute for organizational law.
51. As a historical matter, it should be kept in mind that the law of secured interests is
relatively recent and localized law. In the United States, where that body of law appears most
advanced, it expanded to something approximating its current scope only with the advent, in the
mid-twentieth century, of the U.C.C. Most contemporary forms of organizational law are
substantially older, having arisen when the law of security interests was much less well-
developed, and hence even less useful than it is now as an alternative approach to asset
partitioning.
52. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Unity of Property Rights (June 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
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It is possible that the law of security interests will continue to evolve,
so that it provides not only for floating assets and floating debt, but also for
floating secured parties. Perhaps, too, it will at some point come to offer a
form of liquidation protection. If so, the line between organizational law
and the law of secured interests may become quite indistinct-particularly
given the tendency of organizational law to develop forms like the business
trust, discussed below, that can be effectively employed as pure asset
partitioning devices.
VI. BENEFITS OF DEFENSIVE ASSET PARTITIONING
Defensive asset partitioning limits the exposure of the personal assets
of a firm's owners to the claims of business creditors. In contrast to
affirmative asset partitioning, which by and large takes a single form, we
observe many degrees of defensive asset partitioning. These range, as we
noted in Part Ill, from none whatsoever in the contemporary general
partnership to complete claim exclusion (conventional "limited liability")
in most corporate forms, with various intermediate forms between these
extremes (and even more in the past). As this variety suggests, defensive
asset partitioning has costs as well as benefits, and those costs and benefits
are sometimes in close balance. In this respect, defensive asset partitioning
contrasts with affirmative asset partitioning, the net benefits of which are so
decisive that it is today an element of all of the law's standard forms for
enterprise organization.
The costs of defensive asset partitioning, which are conspicuous, derive
principally from the possibilities it creates for the firm's owners to act
opportunistically toward business creditors. If the credit required for the
business substantially exceeds the value of the assets held by the firm, then
limited liability creates an inducement for the owners of the firm to divert
value from the firm's creditors by any of a variety of means, such as
shirking with respect to their own promised effort, investing in excessively
risky projects, or simply withdrawing assets from the firm in anticipation of
insolvency.
The benefits of defensive asset partitioning, on the other hand, are
various. Some of those benefits have been well-explored in the existing
literature,53 while others have not. We briefly survey here the most
important of these benefits.
53. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 93-101; Paul Halpern et al., An
Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 147-49
(1980); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REv. 80,
99-107 (1991); Susan E. Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the Finn, 141 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 601, 601-02 (1985).
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A. Monitoring Economies
To begin with, limits on liability create monitoring economies much
like those generated by affirmative asset partitioning. Just as affirmative
asset partitioning permits firm creditors to focus their attention principally
on the firm's assets, defensive asset partitioning permits the personal
creditors of the firm's owners to focus principally on the personal assets of
owners. From the perspective of the two sets of creditors, defensive and
affirmative asset partitioning are largely symmetric: Affirmative asset
partitioning is "defensive" with respect to the claims of personal creditors,
and defensive asset partitioning is "affirmative" with respect to the claims
of personal creditors.
Defensive asset partitioning also generates potential monitoring
economies for the firm's owners. As others have observed, in the absence
of limited liability, each of a firm's owners would have an interest in
continually monitoring not only the assets and liabilities of their jointly
owned business, but also the personal assets and liabilities of their fellow
owners.54 It is not only conventional limited liability that generates these
monitoring economies. They are also offered by weaker forms of defensive
asset partitioning-such as multiple personal liability or pro rata personal
liability55-though in lesser degree.
B. Decisionmaking Economies
Defensive asset partitioning also performs functions that have no
parallel in the context of affirmative asset partitioning. Chief among these is
reducing the costs of firm governance. One way in which defensive asset
partitioning can reduce governance costs is by lowering the decisionmaking
costs of a firm-such as a corporation-in which multiple owners share in
the legal right to control the firm's policies or select its managers. Limited
liability ensures that all owners in such a firm experience the same
proportional gains and losses from the firm's policies, regardless of their
identities or assets. Consequently, limited liability gives these owners a
homogeneous economic interest in the firm's decisions, which greatly
facilitates collective decisionmaking.56 Weaker forms of defensive asset
partitioning can be expected to reduce governance costs in much the same
54. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23.
55. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (exploring a rule of pro rata liability).
56. For a related argument concerning the virtues of having a corporate income tax that is
strongly separated from the personal tax liability of the corporation's shareholders, see Hideki
Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV.
211, 229-34 (1991). On the importance of homogeneity of interest among those who share
ownership in firms generally, see HANSMANN, supra note 5.
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way. For example, pro rata shareholder liability homogenizes the
preferences of shareholders as effectively as full limited liability so long as
all shareholders are able to cover their share of the firm's liabilities. In the
complete absence of defensive asset partitioning, on the other hand,
owners-such as partners in a general partnership-must select fellow
owners with similar assets and risk preferences or face significant
negotiating costs.
C. Enhanced Creditor Monitoring
A second way in which defensive asset partitioning can reduce
governance costs is by shifting some of the burden of monitoring the firm's
managers from the firm's owners to its creditors. This is a particularly
conspicuous advantage of full limited liability in firms that, like most public
corporations, are managed by professional managers.
In effect, limited liability permits the firm to enlist creditors as
monitors. If creditors know that they have recourse only to assets held by
the firm, they are more likely than they otherwise would be to scrutinize
closely-both before and after extending credit-the likely fortunes of the
firm and the behavior of the firm's managers. The resulting creditor
monitoring may often be a useful complement to monitoring by the firm's
owners, even when these owners themselves can monitor with fair
competence. Creditors may have access to different types of information
than do owners, and they may also have different means for influencing
managers. But creditor monitoring of managers may have particularly
strong efficiencies when a firm's owners are poorly situated to monitor the
organization's managers for themselves, as with corporations that have
numerous dispersed shareholders. In firms of the latter type, important
creditors may sometimes be even better overall monitors of management
than are the firm's owners. Limited liability gives creditors the incentive to
make use of their monitoring abilities-for which, of course, they will
extract a price from the firm's owners in the cost they charge for credit.
In contrast to other benefits from defensive asset partitioning, the
strength of partitioning matters a great deal here. Full limited liability is a
credible incentive for creditors; weaker forms, such as double liability and
pro rata liability, give creditors a much weaker monitoring incentive as long
as a firm's owners are solvent. The same is true of the next benefit we
examine.
D. Collection Economies
A third benefit of defensive asset partitioning, often given as a
justification for limited liability in publicly held business corporations, is
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that the costs of securing and collecting personal judgments against the
personal assets of the firm's owners would consume a large fraction of the
amount collected-so large as to render personal liability inefficient, in the
sense that shareholders would be better off ex ante paying more for credit in
return for a pledge from creditors not to collect from them personally.
There is undoubtedly some truth to this, though it perhaps has been
exaggerated. Corporations with numerous shareholders that bore personal
liability for the firm's unpaid debts were relatively common in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and procedures for collecting
personal judgments against their owners, at least in some contexts, were
developed to the point where the transaction costs of collecting were
evidently quite manageable 7
E. Economies of Transfer
Limited liability is also commonly said to facilitate the transferability
of ownership shares in an organization such as a business corporation. This
point, which is undoubtedly correct, is closely related to the monitoring and
governance economies considered above. As a practical matter, markets for
ownership interests are unlikely to form unless traders can separate the
value of these shares from their own personal assets and the personal assets
of other owners. Limited liability obviously permits such a separation.
Weaker forms of defensive asset partitioning can, however, effect the same
separation in varying degrees, as evidenced by historical examples of
business corporations whose shares have traded freely under regimes of
multiple or pro rata shareholder liability.58
F. Risk-Bearing Economies
Finally, risk sharing provides a potential rationale for defensive asset
partitioning. It is important here to distinguish between two forms of risk
sharing. The first is risk sharing between a firm's creditors and its owners.
Limited liability, the most extreme form of defensive asset partitioning, has
the important advantage here that, by putting a greater or lesser amount of
equity in the firm, the balance between the risk borne by owners and that
borne by the firm's creditors can be modulated over a wide range. Weaker
forms of defensive partitioning, in turn, provide for even greater risk
bearing by owners.
57. Macey & Miller, supra note 14, at 55-57.
58. See Peter Grossman, The Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability: The
Case of American Express, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 72-75 (1995); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra
note 55, at 1923-25; Macey & Miller, supra note 14, at 35-39; Weinstein, supra note 13, at 7-9.
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The second form of risk sharing is among the owners themselves. A
background rule of joint and several liability (that is, no defensive asset
partitioning) gives the owners little control over their relative exposure to
risk. The degree of control available then increases progressively as
increasingly stronger forms of defensive partitioning are employed.
G. The Evolution of Defensive Asset Partitioning
As the previous discussion indicates, defensive asset partitioning can
offer various efficiencies, only one of which-the reduction of monitoring
costs-directly parallels an efficiency of affirmative asset partitioning.
Many of these efficiencies can be realized with weaker limitations on the
liability of owners, such as multiple liability and pro rata liability. This may
explain the complex pattern of evolution that defensive asset partitioning
has followed over the past two centuries.
In the late nineteenth century, a variety of intermediate forms of
defensive asset partitioning were in common use, including all of the forms
described in Part Ill-pro rata liability, multiple liability, and liability
limited by guarantee. Today these intermediate forms have largely fallen
into disuse,59 leaving only the two extreme rules-full limited liability on
the one hand, and unlimited joint and several personal liability on the other
hand. Moreover, the gap between these two extreme forms has widened, as
a result of recent changes in U.S. bankruptcy and partnership law. Those
changes increase the priority of partnership creditors vis- -vis personal
creditors in the partners' personal assets, and also increase the effective size
of the claim that partnership creditors can assert against the personal assets
of individual partners.
One likely reason for this evolution lies in improved mechanisms for
controlling opportunism toward creditors on the part of corporate
shareholders, hence making the full limited liability that characterizes the
corporate form workable for a broader range of firms. These mechanisms
include, for example, improved accounting standards, more extensive
disclosure, more sophisticated credit rating services, and other institutional
monitors. They also include more specialized forms of regulation, such as
the mandatory deposit insurance and accompanying federal financial
supervision now imposed on most U.S. banking institutions.
A second reason lies in the increasing availability of the corporate
form, and other limited liability forms, to small-scale enterprise. Until well
into the twentieth century, the corporate form was designed almost
59. The company limited by guarantee is still in common use in some Commonwealth
jurisdictions, but is now used almost exclusively to form nonprofit entities of the sort formed in
the United States under a nonprofit corporation statute, which is lacking in U.K. law. DAVIES,
supra note 15, at 10- 11.
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exclusively for large-scale enterprise, and did not accommodate the types of
specialized arrangements (such as shareholder voting agreements and
restrictions on share transferability) needed for small firms. Small-scale
enterprise was therefore effectively restricted to the partnership form even
for those firms that would otherwise have chosen limited liability. It
therefore made sense to apply to partnerships an intermediate form of
defensive asset partitioning (with priority in personal assets for personal
creditors) as a compromise: It allowed owners of a firm to pledge their
personal assets to firm creditors when, as was often the case, that was the
efficient thing to do, but still provided at least some ability to insulate an
individual's personal financial affairs from the vicissitudes of the firms he
invested in.
In the course of the twentieth century, however, the corporate form
became sufficiently flexible to accommodate the special needs of small
firms. The result is that a firm of any size can choose freely between a rule
of limited liability (by forming as a corporation, or, today, as a limited
liability company or a statutory business trust) and a rule of unlimited
liability (by forming as a partnership). The need for a compromise form of
defensive asset partitioning has therefore disappeared, and it now makes
sense to offer, to those firm owners who wish to pledge their personal assets
to firm creditors, the greatest possible freedom to make such a pledge.6"
VII. Is LAW NECESSARY FOR DEFENSIVE ASSET PARTITIONING?
Given that strong defensive asset partitioning-limited liability-is
evidently efficient for most firms, it remains to ask whether organizational
60. Larry Ribstein offers a different view. He argues, first, that the partnership form is
moving closer to the corporate form because the "exhaustion principle," under which partnership
assets must be exhausted before partnership creditors can pursue individual assets, has been
extended from contract creditors under the U.P.A., to contract and tort creditors under the
R.U.P.A. Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 430 n.65 (1992); see BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 8, § 5.08(g). We
are unpersuaded, because tort liability is, in our view, irrelevant to the legitimate functions of
organizational law. See infra text accompanying notes 67-68 (discussing the distinction between
organizational and tort law). In addition, Ribstein argues that the shift in priorities under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, under which the creditors of individual partners lost their priority in the
assets of these partners, was an instance of inefficient federal intervention in an area of
organizational law best left to the states. Larry E. Ribstein, The Illogic and Limits of Partners'
Liability in Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 65-67 (1997). We disagree. The corporate
form, once universally available, captures all of the creditor-monitoring economies available
under the old U.P.A. priority rules for partners' creditors. Section 40(i) of the old U.P.A. gave
individual creditors priority in individual assets, which encouraged partnership creditors to ignore
personal assets and individual creditors to monitor business interests only insofar as these were
among the partners' personal assets. U.P.A. §40(i), 6 U.L.A. 902 (1995). The corporate form, of
course, puts business and individual creditors in virtually the same position. Given this, the
partnership form retains value only as an unlimited liability alternative to the corporate form,
which implies that the claim of partnership creditors should be strengthened-they should have
the same claim on the assets of individual partners as do individual creditors.
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law is necessary to establish this form of partitioning, as it is to establish
affirmative asset partitioning.
A. Establishing Limited Liability by Contract
In the absence of organizational law, the default rule would presumably
be unlimited joint and several liability for a firm's owners of roughly the
type found in the contemporary (post-1978) general partnership. This is
because, so long as the owners retain some minimal degree of control over
the firm's managers (or are the managers themselves), the managers would
be considered agents of the owners and the law of agency would therefore
make each owner personally liable for all of the firm's debts.
Is organizational law necessary to reverse this default and permit the
establishment of limited liability or other forms of defensive asset
partitioning? To put the question more precisely, suppose there were a body
of organizational law that permitted affirmative asset partitioning but did
not provide for defensive asset partitioning. That is, suppose the only
available legal entity were the modem general partnership. How difficult
would it be to establish limited liability--or other forms of defensive asset
partitioning-for a general partnership using only the tools of contract?
To accomplish this, it would be necessary for the partnership to insert,
in its contracts with all of its creditors, provisions whereby the creditor
waived any right to proceed against the partners' personal assets to obtain
satisfaction of the creditor's claims against the firm. This might involve
high transaction costs, at least if there were an effort to extend it to all of
the firm's creditors, including the smallest trade creditors. While it might
not be difficult to draft up the necessary language for the waivers, it could
be costly to induce all creditors-particularly small trade creditors who
utilize standard-form contracts or invoices of their own that do not include
such a waiver-to incorporate the waivers in their contracts with the firm.6
On the other hand, even at their worst, these transaction costs would be
vastly smaller than the transaction costs, described earlier, that would be
necessary to establish affirmative asset partitioning by contract. There
would be no need to alter contracts between the individual owners and all
of their individual creditors, and no need to confront the moral hazard
associated with that contracting.
61. A further problem is the possible ambiguity as to precisely which assets belonged to the
firm, and hence were available to satisfy its creditors. However, the analogous ambiguity in
determining the extent of partnership assets has not proven to be insurmountable. In addition, this
ambiguity can be reduced by acquiring assets in the name of the firm. See Ribstein, supra note 53,
at 108.
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Indeed, there is historical experience with such a regime of limited
liability by contract.62 In England, prior to 1844, the corporate form was not
generally available to manufacturing firms. Consequently, large
manufacturing firms commonly formed as joint stock companies with
transferable shares-a noncorporate form that had roughly the legal
characteristics of a partnership, including joint and several personal liability
for all of the firm's obligations. Between 1844 and 1855, manufacturing
firms were permitted to incorporate, but still were denied limited liability.
Only with the enactment of the English Limited Liability Act in 1855 was
incorporation with limited liability made generally available. The pre-1855
unlimited liability regime did not, however, prevent the formation of large
firms with multiple owners. By 1844, there were nearly one thousand joint
stock companies in England, some with thousands of shareholders. These
companies commonly sought to limit their members' liability for the firm's
debts to third parties by such means as inserting the "Limited" after the
company's name, putting an indication of limited liability in the company's
stationery, and including limited liability clauses in the company's
contracts.63 The courts ultimately gave at least a partial blessing to these
practices, holding that a standard "limited liability" clause inserted into all
of a joint stock company's contracts with creditors was effective, 64 although
simply inserting such a clause into a joint stock company's deed of
association would not bind creditors even if they had express notice of it.65
In sum, while organizational law plays a role in reducing the
transaction costs of establishing defensive asset partitioning, that role is
substantially less important than the role that organizational law plays in
affirmative asset partitioning. The latter, unlike the former, would generally
be quite impossible to establish without organizational law. This critical
point has been missed by contemporary scholars who, recognizing that
limited liability could be established by contract, have gone on to conclude
that corporation law as a whole does no more than avoid unnecessary
contracting costs by offering convenient default terms.
66
62. The English experience recounted here is discussed in detail in BLUMBERG, supra note
13, § 1.03, at 9-23.
63. Id. § 1.03.2, at 15-16.
64. Hallett v. Dowdall, 21 L.J.Q.B. 98 (1852).
65. In re Sea, Fire & Life Ins. Co., 43 Eng. Rep. 180, 186-87 (1854).
66. For example, Posner, supra note 19, states:
[Questions of tort liability] to one side, the primary utility of corporation law lies in
providing a set of standard, implied contract terms, for example, governing credit, so
that business firms do not have to stipulate these terms anew every time they transact,
although they could do so if necessary. To the extent that the terms implied by
corporation law accurately reflect the normal desires of transacting parties, they reduce
the costs of transactions.... A corporation law that is out of step with [commercial]
realities, and so induces contracting parties to draft waivers of the contract terms
supplied by the law, is inefficient because it imposes unnecessary transaction costs.
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B. Organizational Law Versus Tort Law
Although it is to some extent a question of interpretation whether
organizational law is important for limiting the personal liability of owners
toward a firm's contractual creditors, there is no doubt that organizational
law is essential to shield owners of an organization from personal liability
to tort victims. Almost by definition, basic contractual devices are
insufficient to establish such protection.
To say that organizational law is essential for the creation of limited
liability in tort is not to say, however, that organizational law serves an
important efficiency-enhancing purpose in doing so. Limited liability in tort
is a doctrine of very dubious efficiency. Tort victims have no control over
the type of legal entity that injures them. Consequently, to make the amount
recovered by a tort victim depend upon the legal form of the organization
responsible for the tort is to permit the externalization of accident costs, and
indeed to invite the choice of legal entity to be governed in important part
by the desire to seek such externalization.
Thus, while allowing the intentional use of the corporate form to limit
liability in contract makes eminent sense, to permit the intentional use of
the corporate form to limit liability in tort does not make sense. Of course,
if unlimited shareholder liability for tort damages would interfere seriously
with the tradability of corporate shares, or if collection of excess liability
judgments from numerous corporate shareholders would necessarily be a
very costly process, then limited liability in tort might be justified, at least
for publicly traded business corporations, as a regrettable necessity. But this
does not appear to be the case. A much weaker form of defensive asset
partitioning for corporate torts-namely, a rule of unlimited pro rata
shareholder liability-would apparently protect the marketability of
corporate shares without permitting shareholders to externalize the costs of
corporate torts.67
In fact, corporate limited liability in tort appears to be a historical
accident, perhaps encouraged in important part by the rarity, during the
formative period of business corporation law in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, of tort liability sufficient to bankrupt a corporation. The
Id. at 506 (emphasis added). Our argument here is that, when it comes to establishing affirmative
asset partitioning, the parties could not "do so if necessary" by contractual means absent
organizational law, and that "the primary utility of corporation law" thus lies in that partitioning.
(To be sure, Posner's statement is arguably accurate if he is assuming that, absent corporation law,
the parties could still resort to modem partnership law, and obtain affirmative asset partitioning by
that means, building up the rest by contract.)
67. A rule of pro rata liability would need to be accompanied by subordination of tort
claimants to contractual creditors in corporate bankruptcy, in order to keep the value of
contractual claims independent of the personal wealth of individual shareholders. See Hansmann
& Kraakman, supra note 55, at 1901-02.
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
increasing use of the corporate form for small businesses, together with the
recent advent of potentially massive tort liability for environmental harms,
workplace hazards, and injurious products, suggests that the issue should be
revisited-as we have argued at length elsewhere.68
VIII. DOES ORGANIZATIONAL LAW SERVE OTHER ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS?
We have argued here that provision for affirmative asset partitioning is
an essential function of organizational law, in the sense that firms could not
be given this important attribute practicably in the absence of organizational
law. Defensive asset partitioning, though also a useful function of
organizational law, is less important for the creation of large-scale
enterprise. Moreover, whatever the utility of defensive asset partitioning,
provision for defensive asset partitioning is not an essential function of
organizational law, as we use the term "essential" here, since it would be
feasible to establish defensive asset partitioning by contract even if the law
did not make special provision for it.
It remains to ask whether organizational law serves other essential
functions as well. That is, are there other important features of modern
organizations that could not feasibly be established by contract in the
absence of organizational law?
The question is posed squarely by the recent evolution of the statutory
business trust, as exemplified by the Delaware Business Trust Act.6 9 The
statute provides for both affirmative asset partitioning and defensive asset
partitioning, with the latter being in the form of full limited liability of the
type found in business corporations. The statute leaves virtually all other
aspects of organizational structure open, however, permitting the formation
of limited liability legal entities with virtually any desired designation of
owners, and with virtually any conceivable assignment of control and
distribution rights among the owners. Given this highly protean form, why
does Delaware need any other forms? Are Delaware's other statutory forms
for legal entities-including business corporations, limited liability
companies, nonprofit corporations, cooperative corporations, general
partnerships, and limited partnerships-now merely conveniences, serving
the same function as privately provided standard-form contracts, or do they
perform a more essential role, permitting the formation of types of firms
that could not be created practicably in their absence using just the business
trust statute with appropriate contractual additions and adjustments?"
68. Id. at 1880-81.
69. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801-3820 (1995).
70. Larry Ribstein has argued in a similar vein for a "contractual entity" statute that would
provide investors with limited liability but none of the other provisions of a detailed standard form
of legal entity. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407, 435-446
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In answering this question, there are three functions performed by
organizational law that need to be considered, each of which involves
relations among different groups of actors. The first is to govern relations
between the firm-which is to say, the firm's owners and managers-and
the firm's creditors. The second is to govern relationships among the firm's
owners and between the firm's owners and managers. The third is to govern
relations between the firm and its nonowner patrons. We deal with these
three sets of functions in turn. We do not seek to explore the issues
involved in detail, but simply to touch on the main issues.
A. Facilitating Contracting with Creditors
Organizational law often contains provisions other than asset
partitioning that help a firm's owners bond themselves credibly to its
creditors. These include, for example, limitations on the ability to pay
dividends that would impair legal capital, and (at least in Europe) minimum
capital requirements. In the absence of controlling provisions in
organizational law, however, these matters could-like limited liability-
evidently be governed feasibly by inserting appropriate terms in the firm's
contracts with its creditors. 71 Affirmative asset partitioning is unique in that
it involves an assignment of property claims to creditors that could not be
made effectively, on behalf of the firm's owners, by a contract just between
those owners (or their collective agent, the firm's managers) and the firm's
creditors. Once the law provides the means for affirmative asset
partitioning, the owners of the firm can use simple contracts with the firm's
creditors to make commitments as to such matters as the quantity and
nature (for example, riskiness) of the assets that the firm will hold, and
hence will pledge to its creditors.
B. Facilitating Contracting Among Owners and Mahagers
Much of organizational law-such as rules concerning governance of
the firm and distribution of the firm's earnings-regulates relations among
the owners of a firm and relations between the firm's owners and its
managers. As others have observed, however, these matters could generally
be handled relatively easily, in the absence of organizational law, through
privately supplied standard-form contracts.72
(1999). The Delaware Business Trust Act is in effect such a contractual entity statute, which
provides for limited liability and-even more importantly-affirmative asset partitioning.
§§ 3803(a), 3805(b).
71. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, at 396.
72. E.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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This is true, in particular, of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, which
are sometimes thought to be particularly dependent on the law. Consider,
for example, the managers' duty of loyalty. This consists, in essence, of a
promise on the part of the manager not to engage in self-interested
transactions involving the firm's property and prospects. That promise-
accompanied, if needed, by a definition in any appropriate level of detail of
what types of transactions will be considered self-interested, and what
forms of disclosure and approval are required-can simply be inserted into
the firn's founding document and incorporated by reference in the
employment contract with each of the firm's managers. The same is true of
the duty of care. Indeed, even absent such explicit contracting, the law of
agency would impose on managers, as a default rule, fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care that are the rough equivalent of those that are imposed by
most forms of organizational law.73
C. Transferability of Ownership
The law permits free transferability of ownership interests in some
types of legal entities, such as the business corporation. Absent that legal
doctrine, an owner might not be presumed to have the power to substitute
another person for himself with respect to his rights and obligations toward
his fellow owners and toward third parties to whom the firm has contractual
obligations. Yet both contractual rights and contractual duties can in
general be made transferable, under the law of contracts, so long as all
contracting parties expressly agree.74 Thus, to establish free transferability
of ownership interests absent specific organizational law doctrine to that
effect, it should be sufficient to put terms to that effect in the owners'
association agreement and into the firm's contracts with each of its
creditors. This might be burdensome, but it would not be infeasible. The
contracting costs involved would presumably be comparable to those of
establishing limited liability by contract.
D. Withdrawal Rights
In some contemporary legal entities-such as the partnership at will-
the firm's owners are free to withdraw their share of the firm's assets at any
time. Other standard-form legal entities, however, permit limits on the
withdrawal rights of individual owners. The business corporation is
73. For a more extended discussion of contractual approaches to fiduciary duties, see
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 40, at 447-50.
74. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 11.11 (1990) (stating that
contractual duties can be delegated, and the delegating party can be discharged from liability, if
there is consent by the party to whom the duties are owed).
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conspicuous among these; shareholders generally cannot withdraw their
individual share of the firm's assets short of dissolution, and dissolution
generally requires consent of the holders of at least fifty percent of the
firm's shares.
Could such limits on withdrawal lights be established in the absence of
organizational law? There is room to doubt that they could be. Suppose, for
example, that the co-owners of a business were to hold their joint property
as tenants in common. Then, as we noted earlier,75 they might not be able to
agree to waive their individual rights to force partition of the property for
more than a finite period of time. It is not a question of transaction costs;
the law simply prohibits unlimited agreements not to partition. Thus, to
mimic fully the attributes of all contemporary legal entities, arguably, the
law must not just make special provision for affirmative asset partitioning,
but must also provide that co-owners can commit not to withdraw their
share of jointly held partitioned assets unless there is agreement to that
effect by the fraction of the co-owners that is stated in their contract of
association.
We might think of this as a third element of asset partitioning. We have
already noted two distinct elements of asset partitioning: priority of claims
and liquidation protection from personal creditors of the firm's owners. The
third element we are considering here is liquidation protection from the
individual owners themselves. These two forms of liquidation generally go
hand in hand. Strong-form legal entities, which are characterized by
liquidation protection from the owners' personal creditors, also typically
provide for substantial liquidation protection from the owners themselves.
Or, put differently, the liquidation powers of an owner's personal creditors
are generally the same as those of the owner himself. For example, since
personal creditors of a bankrupt corporate shareholder step into the
bankrupt's role as shareholder, those creditors can force liquidation of the
corporation's assets only if the shareholder held enough shares in the
corporation-generally fifty percent-to have been able to force liquidation
himself.
E. Facilitating Contracting with Other Patrons: Nondistribution
Constraints
Some legal entities embody a formal separation of control rights from
distribution rights whereby those who control the firm are barred from
appropriating the firm's net earnings, either currently or upon liquidation.
That separation is a defining feature, in particular, of nonprofit entities,
including the nonprofit corporation, the charitable trust, and the civil-law
75. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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foundation.76 Could organizations be given this attribute without the benefit
of specially designed organizational law? While something close might be
achieved using only contractual devices, it would fall short of a complete
substitute.
77
In this respect, then, the law of charitable trusts and nonprofit
corporations arguably adds something to the law, beyond asset partitioning,
that is "essential" in the sense we use here: It could not feasibly be
replicated in the absence of organizational law.78 Several qualifications are
worth making, however. First, the nondistribution constraint is confined to
several standard-form legal entities that are employed today for a relatively
small subset of all organizations. Second, something close to the
nondistribution constraint evidently could be achieved simply by
contractual means. Third, the barriers to crafting a do-it-yourself
nondistribution constraint arise not from transaction costs but from legal
prohibitions of contestable utility. Fourth, the nondistribution constraint has
a bonding character with substantial parallels to asset partitioning: It is a
means by which those who control the firm pledge to its donors-who are
effectively a subset of the firm's creditors-that the firm's assets and net
earnings will not be diverted from the objects that the donors intended.
76. Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
77. An organization's founders could, presumably, put a nondistribution constraint in the
contract of association that serves as the organization's founding document. To be fully effective,
however, that provision would need to be unamendable, even by unanimous agreement of the
organization's founders and controllers, since the purpose of the constraint is to protect third
parties-donors and beneficiaries-against opportunism by controlling persons. That is, the
constraint is a means by which those who control the organization bond themselves not to take a
stake in the firm that will give them an incentive to exploit the firm's other patrons. The law,
however, frowns on nonrenegotiable contracts. See Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral
Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 208-09
(1997). Consequently, it is doubtful that founders could make the nondistribution constraint
unamendable simply by entering into an agreement to that effect among themselves.
An alternative approach might be to have the firm make a contractual commitment to each
donor, in return for the donor's contribution, to maintain and adhere to the nondistribution
provisions in the charter. The result, however, would still not quite create the complete equivalent
of the nonprofit corporation. For, in most states of the United States, it is possible and indeed
common to create nonprofit corporations in which both donors and beneficiaries lack not just
voting rights but also the right to sue the organization's managers either directly or derivatively,
with the result that neither donors nor beneficiaries have any rights of control over the
organization's managers. Arguably the tools of the common law are inadequate to achieve this
result, in which perpetual obligations are imposed on self-appointing managers who, because of
the absence of control over them, cannot be considered agents of any party in interest.
78. The Delaware Business Trust Act, interestingly, specifically authorizes use of the
business trust form for the formation of organizations of a nonprofit character. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12. § 3801(a) (1995). The Act does not, however, make it clear how a nondistribution
constraint is to be imposed under the Act.
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F. Essential Tenns Versus Useful Terms
The preceding discussion has sought to show that, with the possible
exception of some elements of the law of nonprofit organizations, aspects
of organizational law other than asset partitioning are not "essential" in the
sense that workable substitutes for them could not be found elsewhere in
the law. This is not to say, however, that elements of organizational law
other than asset partitioning are trivial and could be dispensed with
costlessly.
There are a number of ways in which standard-form legal entities can
reduce the costs of contracting for a firm's owners. Among these are
(1) simplifying the drafting of the firm's charter; (2) helping to avoid
mistakes in choosing the details of the organization's form; (3) putting all
parties on notice of nonstandard provisions (by effectively requiring that all
nonstandard provisions, and only those provisions, must be specifically set
out in the organization's charter); (4) providing owners with a highly
credible device for bonding their commitments to each other and to those
with whom they and the firm deal; (5) facilitating the efficient evolution
of standard-form provisions, which are in part a public good; and
(6) permitting modification of existing relationships among the parties
involved in a firm, without requiring the parties' explicit consent, when
existing contractual arrangements prove inefficient.
These and other efficiencies offered by the various detailed rules
governing standard-form legal entities are important. There is every reason
to believe that those rules significantly reduce the costs of commercial
activity. This is strongly suggested, for example, by the fact that most
developed market economies provide for standard-form legal entities that
are similar in their basic features. Our claim, however, is not that aspects of
organizational law other than asset partitioning are not important. Rather, it
is that the economies involved are not of the same order as those involved
in asset partitioning. Or, put more strongly, the commercial order of a
contemporary market economy could still be established without these
features of organizational law, while it could not exist without legal
provision for affirmative asset partitioning. The latter is the only important
feature of modem firms for which substitutes could not be crafted, at any
price that is even remotely conceivable, using just the basic tools of
contract, property, and agency law.
G. Enabling Rules, Mandatory Rules, and Default Rules
The general view of organizational law today is that it is primarily
enabling in character. That view is especially prominent in the literature on
business corporations, which is, naturally, by far the largest body of
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contemporary organizational law scholarship. Within that body of
scholarship, there has been an extensive debate on the extent to which
corporate law is strictly enabling. That debate has focused largely on the
extent to which corporate law imposes important rules that are mandatory
in character rather than simply defaults. It generally deals with contractual
terms that the parties could have adopted on their own, but which, instead
of being left to the parties to choose, are either (a) prohibited or
(b) required.79
Our concern here, in contrast, is not with the limits that corporate law,
or organizational law in general, imposes on parties' freedom to contract.
Rather, we are concerned with the enabling aspects of the law. We are
asking what organizational law permits parties to accomplish that they
could not otherwise do. On this point, the existing literature is much
thinner. On the rare occasions when the issue has been addressed with any
directness in the contemporary literature, the answer suggested typically has
been that the law plays no essential role in this respect, but rather just offers
standard-form contractual provisions of the sort that might also be provided
by law firms or other private actors.80 Our answer, of course, is different.
H. Theories of Juridical Personality
There is a vast literature, with deep roots in nineteenth-century German
scholarship, on the nature of juridical persons. The debate over competing
conceptions of juridical persons that is the central preoccupation of that
literature still shows some life today, in terms not much removed from
those of a century ago.81 One might think that there would be substantial
overlap between the issues in that debate and those that we are dealing with
here. Yet, while the literature on juridical persons sometimes points to a
79. The issues and the literature in this debate, which reached its peak in the late 1980s, are
well-surveyed in Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990).
80. E.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1 (repeating the analysis offered earlier in
Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1444-46
(1989)); POSNER, supra note 1; Posner, supra note 19. This view also seems implicit in much of
the literature debating the issue of mandatory rules, of which Easterbrook and Fischel's article
forms a part. All of these analyses, we should note, are too brief and unfocused to offer a clear and
well-argued position on the issue. Hence we refer here, in the text, to the views "suggested" by
these authors.
81. E.g., William G. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989); Mark Hager, Bodies Politic: The
Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 575 (1989);
Katsuhito lwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and
Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583 (1999); Michael J. Phillips,
Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (1994);
Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 519 (1986); Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation
in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987).
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separate patrimony as a key characteristic of a juridical person,82 that
attribute is generally not the focus of analysis. Rather, the traditional
literature is principally concerned with questions-such as the power of the
state versus the power of private organizations, or the nature of group
will-that are tangential to our concerns.
We have sought to offer here a definition of juridical persons that is
simpler, clearer, and more functional than those that have characterized the
traditional literature. Indeed, one reason we have used the term "legal
entity" rather than "juridical person" is to avoid confusion between our
analysis and the more traditional views.
IX. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Given the critical role of law in permitting affirmative asset
partitioning, it is natural to ask when and where, as a historical matter,
affirmative asset partitioning evolved as a feature of organizational law.
The answer to that question is difficult to determine from conventional
sources. While there is extensive scholarship tracing the evolution of
defensive asset partitioning (in particular, limited liability),83 the evolution
of affirmative asset partitioning appears to have been largely ignored in the
literature on legal and economic history-a reflection, presumably, of the
surprisingly low level of self-consciousness about affirmative asset
partitioning in the literature generally. The exception is a recent essay by
Paul Mahoney, which builds on an earlier version of this Article to explore
the history of corporate entities with particular emphasis on affirmative and
defensive asset partitioning (for which Mahon V uses the terms "forward"
and "reverse" asset partitioning, respectively).
Prior to the advent of the investor-owned business corporation, which is
largely a creature of the past two centuries, partnership was the form
commonly used for jointly owned businesses. The interesting historical
question, then, is when affirmative asset partitioning became a well-
established aspect of partnership law." It is possible to have a form of
82. For example, among the principal competing theories that emerged from the nineteenth-
century debate, this is true both of the theory associated with Savigny and of that associated with
Brinz. See Arthur Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 255-57 (1911);
Martin Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons, 54 LAW Q. REV. 494,496-97 (1938).
83. E.g., BLUMBERG, supra note 13; LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE CORPORATION (Tony
Orhnial ed., 1982); Kevin F. Forbes, Limited Liability and the Development of the Business
Corporation, 2 J.L ECON. & ORG. 163 (1986); Shaw Livermore, Unlimited Liability in Early
American Corporations, 43 J. POL. ECON. 674 (1935); Macey & Miller, supra note 14; Weinstein,
supra note 13.
84. Mahoney, supra note 3.
85. While joint stock companies are a relatively recent development in Anglo-American law,
corporations of a nonprofit character-including universities, monasteries, and other
eleemosynary institutions-have been common for nearly a millennium. E.g., 2 JOHN P. DAVIS,
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partnership that provides for collective agency without affirmative asset
partitioning. We conjecture that this is the way that partnership law first
developed, and that affirmative asset partitioning became a recognized
feature of partnership law only much later. 6 We hope to explore thesehistorical issues more thoroughly in subsequent work.
X. CONCLUSION
There is a strong tendency today to view organizational law as
performing functions similar to those typically performed by contract law:
providing a standard set of default rules that govern when contracting
parties have not specifically decided otherwise, and perhaps providing as
well some mandatory rules that protect the interests of parties who would
otherwise be disadvantaged in the contracting process. These contractual
functions of organizational law are undoubtedly useful. They do not,
however, appear to be essential, in the sense that modem firms could not
feasibly be constructed if organizational law did not perform them.
A far more important function of organizational law is to define the
property rights over which participants in a firm can contract. At its
essential core, organizational law is property law, not contract law. In
particular, organizational law permits the formation of a floating lien on the
pool of assets associated with a firm, and permits as well the assignment of
that lien to the constantly changing group of creditors who transact with the
firm, while shielding those assets from creditors of the firm's managers and
owners. This type of affirmative asset partitioning, which plays a critical
role in permitting the formation of the large nexuses of contracts that are
employed to organize most modem business activity, could not otherwise
be accomplished. By contrast, organizational law doctrine establishing
defensive asset partitioning-including the rule of limited liability that is so
often celebrated as a foundational achievement of organizational law-
seems to be of distinctly secondary importance.
CORPORATIONS (Abram Chayes ed., Capricorn Books 1961) (1905); Hansmann, supra note 76, at
843 n.32. Whether or not it was self-consciously thought of as such, affirmative asset partitioning
was apparently always a well-developed aspect of the latter corporations. Because the diffuse
beneficiaries of those corporations were not considered owners of the corporation, however, it was
presumably taken for granted that an individual beneficiary's creditors would have no recourse
against a corporation's assets.
86. Mahoney, supra note 3, offers the view that the legal tools for both affirmative and
defensive asset partitioning may have been available much earlier in the development of the
partnership form. We address Mahoney's stimulating thesis in a forthcoming paper.
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